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DISLOYALTY & DISQUALIFICATION: RECONSTRUCTING
SECTION 3 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Myles S. Lynch*
ABSTRACT
To become President of the United States, you must be constitutionally qualified.
You must be thirty-five years old, a natural born citizen, and fourteen years a resident within the United States. Neither Congress nor any state can set this threshold
higher; the same is true for congresspeople. But since it was last successfully invoked
in 1917, most have forgotten the other qualifier—for officers at both the state and
federal levels—from Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Those who have violated their oath to uphold our Constitution can be disqualified from holding any
public office under the United States or any state. This Article reconstructs this lost
qualification and develops a framework for its twenty-first-century application by
the states, the federal courts, and Congress.
Part I uses sources from and contemporary to the drafting of the Fourteenth
Amendment alongside recent secondary sources to determine what Section 3 means.
Part II then develops a test that can be applied in judging a Section 3 case. Part III
briefly explores mechanisms through which the qualification can be enforced. Part
IV reviews and summarizes some surviving use-cases so that decision makers can
easily compare modern transgressions to precedent. And finally, Part V adopts the
analysis from Parts I and II and scrutinizes a hypothetical person who may be barred
by Section 3. The Article then concludes.
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INTRODUCTION
The country has a right to expect that all who enter [office] shall have
a sure and well-founded loyalty, above all question or “suspicion.”
And such I insist is the rule of the Constitution and of Congress.
—Sen. Charles Sumner1
1

CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1145 (1868).
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After the Civil War ended, Congress recognized that its losers would continue
to fight—if not on the battlefield, then in the political arena.2 So one condition for
readmission into the Union was that confederate states needed to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment.3 While the first and fifth sections of this amendment are well
known today, “no one teaches anything about Sections 2, 3, and 4.”4 Ironically, one
of the least discussed today, Section 3, was one of the most heavily debated by the
Thirty-Ninth Congress.5 And through that debate, what began as temporary disenfranchisement of every disloyal Southerner eventually became permanent disqualification from holding public office for those who betray their oath to uphold the
Constitution of the United States.6 Succinctly put in 1869, by Justice Reade of North
Carolina’s Supreme Court, “the idea [was] that one who had taken an oath to support
the Constitution, and violated it, ought to be excluded from taking it again until
relieved by Congress.”7
Throughout Reconstruction, numerous people were challenged, and disqualified,
by Section 3.8 Since then, however, only one person’s qualifications have been
challenged: a Congressman at the outbreak of the First World War.9 According to
2

See, e.g., id. at 1145–46.
E.g., Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 70, 15 Stat. 73, 74.
4
Mark A. Graber, Teaching the Forgotten Fourteenth Amendment and the Constitution
of Memory, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 639, 639–40 (2018). Section 3 holds that:
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under
the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or
as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall
have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid
or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of twothirds of each House, remove such disability.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
5
See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459–61 (1866). See generally 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, LIBR. OF CONG., https://guides.loc.gov/14th-amendment/digital
-collections (last visited Oct. 27, 2021) (compiling congressional debates on the Fourteenth
Amendment); Mark Graber, Rewarding Loyalty (?) and Punishing Treason Through Disenfranchisement and Bans on Officeholding: Section 3, in THE FORGOTTEN FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2) (on file with author) (“Inverting contemporary
priorities, Republicans spent more energy debating Section 3 than any other provision of the
omnibus Fourteenth Amendment.”).
6
Compare, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2460 (1866), with U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 3.
7
See Worthy v. Barrett, 63 N.C. 199, 204 (1869), appeal dismissed sub nom. Worthy
v. Comm’rs 76 U.S. 611 (1869).
8
See infra Part IV.
9
See infra Section IV.G.
3
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current conceptions of Section 3, which treat it as “generally limited to the context
of the immediate aftermath of the Civil War,” this dormancy makes sense.10 But the
plain text, history, and use of Section 3 show that current conceptions are too
narrow.
This Article shows that violating one’s oath disqualifies them from holding
public office. This disqualification can attach at either the federal or state level,
whether in the legislature, the executive, or the judiciary. These violations consist
of, and only of, obstructing enforcement of the laws of the United States or any state
beyond recourse of the justice system11 and acting in ways that tend to strengthen
the enemies of the United States or weaken the ability of the United States to repel
an invasion.12 But this is still very broad and means that seemingly innocuous
things—like lobbying on behalf of a hostile foreign power, making statements that
delegitimize U.S. Government actors on the world stage, or simply organizing a
mass of people against the American war effort—may prevent people from being
a Member of Congress, an executive official, a governor, or even a state police
officer.
There are, however, certain preconditions for disqualification to attach. First, the
person must have taken a legally required oath13 to uphold the Constitution prior to
their disloyal act.14 Second, except in cases of insurrection and rebellion, there must
be an actual enemy of the United States that was aided or comforted.15 And third,
the relevant decision maker must find that the actions taken were disqualifying.
Disqualification can, however, be removed by getting two thirds of each congressional chamber to grant amnesty.16

10

Am. Citizens v. United States, No. 05-1259, 2006 WL 8444223, at *1 (D.N.M. May 31,
2006) (holding Section 3 was “inapposite here because [its] meaning is generally limited to the
context of the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, when officials of the Union were concerned about the potential mischief that could result if former agents of the Confederacy and
their sympathizers were to take control of Congress.”).
11
See infra Section I.C.
12
See infra Section I.D.
13
This includes all oaths required by Article VI, including: 5 U.S.C. § 3331; 4 U.S.C. § 101;
and potentially U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
14
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3 (“who, having previously taken an oath”).
15
But see Erin Creegan, National Security Crime, 3 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 373, 376 (2012)
(“First, one may commit treason by supporting an enemy of the United States, or, alternatively, by undermining the United States without actually supporting [] a specific enemy.”).
Though this is discussing treason, it is still relevant because, as discussed in Section I.D, the
Section 3 test was in part derived from the treason test. Creegan’s assertion, however, is not
supported by citation, and appears to be contradicted by her discussion of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010), later in her article. Cf. Creegan, supra note 15,
at 379 n.18.
16
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
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Because it has been largely ignored in practice,17 this Article unearths Section
3’s scant history and draws parallels with similar constitutional and common-law
concepts to reconstruct the provision. Accordingly, this Article proceeds in five Parts.
Part I gives a constitutive account of Section 3. Part II develops a Section 3 test. Part
III discusses the mechanisms and procedures for bringing a Section 3 challenge at
different levels of governance and at different stages in the election or appointment
process. Part IV analyzes how Section 3 (and its extraconstitutional predecessor) has
been used by Congress and the courts and discusses their precedential and persuasive
values. And Part V works through a hypothetical example of an official who could
have their qualifications challenged under Section 3. Finally, the Article concludes.
I. THE MEANING OF SECTION 3
In uncovering the proper function of Section 3 and its legal applications, perhaps nothing is more important than showing what the text means. It is increasingly
important to understand what the text originally meant, given the Supreme Court’s
ongoing trend towards originalism.18 This Part uncovers the original public meaning
of Section 319 and imports doctrinal definitions that could affect how courts interpret its
text. It will proceed by separating the text into five pieces: (1) who is considered an
officer of, or under, the United States or any state;20 (2) what it means to have “previously taken an oath . . . to support the Constitution of the United States”; (3) who has
“engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same”; (4) who has “given aid or
17

The last time the judiciary, either federal or state, truly took up the task of interpreting
Section 3 was in 1871. See United States v. Powell, 27 F. Cas. 605, 606 (C.C.D.N.C. 1871) (No.
16,709). Before then, it was only interpreted by one other federal court. See generally In re
Griffin, 11 F. Cas. 7 (Chase, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1869) (No. 5,815). Outside of the courts,
the last time this issue was “litigated” was in 1919, through the House of Representatives. See
H.R. REP. NO. 66-413, at 11–12 (1919), reprinted in Victor L. Berger: Hearings Before the
Special Committee Appointed under the Authority of House Resolution No. 6 Concerning the
Right of Victor L. Berger to be Sworn in as a Member of the Sixty-Sixth Congress (1919)
[hereinafter Berger Hearings]; H.R. REP. NO. 66-414, at 2 (1919), reprinted in Berger Hearings. These precedents will be discussed further throughout this Article.
18
See, e.g., David McDonald, Commentary, We Are All Originalists Now, Sort Of,
REALCLEAR POL. (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2019/08/07/we
_are_all_originalists_now_sort_of_140957.html [https://perma.cc/27ZB-TSRW]; see also
AP Explains: Originalism, Barrett’s Judicial Philosophy, A.P. (Oct. 13, 2020), https://ap
news.com/article/donald-trump-amy-coney-barrett-us-supreme-court-courts-antonin-scalia
-038ec1d4de30d1bd97a0ce3823903f0c [https://perma.cc/T2J9-BGP7].
19
See generally, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
849 (1989).
20
This piece will include two clauses: “No person shall be a Senator or Representative
in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military,
under the United States, or under any State,” and “as a member of Congress, or as an officer
of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State.” See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
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comfort to the enemies thereof”; and (5) when “Congress may by a vote of two-thirds
of each House, remove such a disability.”21 Determining how the legal community
would have originally interpreted these pieces and providing constitutive accounts of
them will primarily be done through inspection of congressional use-cases and accepted legal understandings of terms as of 1868, with some utilization of ratification
debates and enforcing statutes, as necessary, and secondary sources, where they exist.
A. To Whom Does Section 3 Apply?
Section 3 can disqualify oath-bound people seeking to be: (1) Senators or Representatives in Congress; (2) electors of the President and Vice President; or (3) a
holder of any other office, “civil or military, under the United States, or under any
State.”22 The first two groupings are obvious enough: you cannot be a Member of
Congress or a member of the electoral college if Section 3 disqualifies you. And the
third is a catch-all.
On the other hand, Section 3 uses different language in describing the preconditional offices: “a member of Congress, or [] an officer of the United States, [] a
member of any State legislature, or an executive or judicial officer of any State.”23 This
language strongly resembles that of Article VI, which provides the requirement that
officers of the United States and the several states take an oath to uphold the Constitution.24 So, the legal community likely would have understood holding any office
that falls within Article VI—in addition to officers of the uniformed services25—to
trigger Section 3’s precondition for disqualification.
Why not simply use the same language for the precondition as was used in describing offices subject to the qualification? The likely answer is that the disqualifiableoffice language was included as an adaptation of the impeachment-disqualification
clause while the preconditional-office language was imported with slight modification from Article VI.26 One less obvious difference in language is the shift from “no
person shall . . . hold any office under” to “. . . taken an oath as an officer of . . . .”
Though under-explored, it facially appears that people who hold “offices under” are
“officers of.”27 This would mean there is no functional difference.28 But there does
21

Id.
Id.
23
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
24
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3, with U.S. CONST. art. VI.
25
Article VI does not include within its plain terms military offices, but those were clearly
anticipated to be within Section 3 and appears to be the driving force for not importing its
exact language. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2537, 2898–99, 2917, 3030 (1866);
The Reconstruction Acts, 12 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 182, 203 (1867). Section 3 likely also covers
the Article II oath, for reasons discussed below. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
26
Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; id. art. VI, cl. 3, with id. amend. XIV, § 3.
27
This is most clear looking at Article VI:
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of
22
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appear to be some confusion on this point.29 Regardless, these provisions were introduced at separate times, by separate Senators, and without any relevant discussion.30
the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both
of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or
Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever
be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the
United States.
U.S. CONST. art. VI. But every constitutional provision that uses under and of follows this
pattern. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not
extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office
of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States . . . .”); id. art. I, § 6 (“No Senator or Representative shall . . . be appointed any civil Office under the Authority of the United States . . . and
no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House
during his Continuance in Office.”); id. art. I, § 9 (“[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit
or Trust under [the United States], shall, without, the Consent of the Congress, accept of any
present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign
State.”); id. art. II, § 1 (“[N]o Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust
of Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.”); with id. art. I, § 8 (“The
Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department of Officer thereof.”); id. art. II, § 2 (“[The President]
shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for . . . .”); id. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall commission all the
Officers of the United States.”); id. art. II, § 4 (“[A]ll civil Officers of the United States, shall
be removed from Office on Impeachment . . . .”).
28
See United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509–10 (1878) (equating “hold[ing] an
office under the government” to “becoming its officer[]”).
29
Compare 39 CONG. GLOBE 3568 (June 29, 1868) (using of and under interchangeably);
John. R. Tucker, General Amnesty, 126 N. AM. REV. 53, 55 (1878) (“[T]he Senate of the United
States decided that a Senator was not a civil officer of, and a fortiori, under the United
States.”); Reports of Committees of the House of Representatives, 39th Cong. 19–20 (1866)
(“But a little consideration of this matter will show that ‘officers of’ and ‘officers under’ the
United States are . . . ‘indiscriminately used in the Constitution.’ . . . It is irresistibly evident
that no argument can be based on the different sense of the words ‘of’ and [‘]under,’ as used
in these clauses of the Constitution, and we must approach this question as to whether a
member of Congress is an officer ‘under’ the United States, with the knowledge that if we find
him to be either an officer ‘of’ the United States, or one ‘under’ the government of the United
States, in either case he has been brought within the constitutional meaning of these words, as
used in the act of 1852, because they are made by the Constitution equivalent and interchangeable.”), with 2 Cong. Rec. 3987 (May 18, 1874) (“I think there is a distinction between an
officer of the Government and an officer under the Government.”), https://www.google.com
/books/edition/Reports_of_Committees/cqIFAAAAQAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1 [https://perma.cc
/YB3F-L3DZ]; Francis Wharton, State Trials of the United States During the Administrations
of Washington and Adams 269 (1849), https://www.google.com/books/edition/State_Trials_of
_the_United_States_During/m3oDAAAAQAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0 [https://perma.cc/3ZT2-FU2Y].
30
Compare CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768 (1866) (Statement of Sen. Clark), with
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Instead, Section 3 deliberation simply focused on the word “officer” and ignored the
of/under distinction entirely. So, “under” and “of” are likely “equivalent and interchangeable.”31 The only apparent result of this change between the two clauses is
to exclude elector of the President and Vice President as a preconditional office but
include elector as a disqualifiable office.32
With over two million people receiving paychecks from the Federal Government alone,33 and another seven-and-a-half from the states and local governments,34
there are obviously positions that do not qualify as offices and are therefore immune
from Section 3 scrutiny. Buckley v. Valeo35 is the currently governing case as to who
is and is not a federal officer.36 Buckley established that “any appointee exercising
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an ‘Officer of the
United States.’”37 However, determinations as to the meaning of an officer of the
United States, like in Buckley itself, have largely been Appointments Clause challenges, which utilize a two-step analysis of asking (1) whether the position is an
office of the United States and then (2) whether the de facto officer is a de jure
officer; if the answers are yes and no, respectively, then the Appointments Clause
has been violated.38
id. at 2869 (Statement of Sen. Howard). See id. at 2460 (using officers “under” interchangeably
with officers “of”).
31
Reports of Committees of the House of Representatives, 39th Cong. 19–20 (1866),
https://www.google.com/books/edition/Reports_of_Committees/cqIFAAAAQAAJ?hl=en
&gbpv=1 [https://perma.cc/3PZG-766P].
32
Though Congresspeople are not included as officers of the United States, and the
unparallel phrasing of Section 3 suggests the inverse is true for state legislators, it appears
state legislators should fall within both categories. See Daniel J. Hemel, Disqualifying
Insurrectionists and Rebels: A How-To Guide, LAWFARE (Jan. 19, 2021, 1:43 PM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/disqualifying-insurrectionists-and-rebels-how-guide [https://perma
.cc/VP7B-YD6G]; ch. 114, § 14, 16 Stat. 113 (1870) (“whenever any person shall hold office,
except as a member of Congress or of some State legislature, contrary to the provisions of
[Section 3]”); The Reconstruction Acts, 12 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 182, 203–04 (1867). Contra
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392–93 (1979) (discussing the canon against surplusage).
33
CONG. RSCH. SERV., FEDERAL WORKFORCE STATISTICS SOURCES: OPM & OMB (last updated Oct. 23, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43590.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2HY-RUZX].
34
States with Most Government Employees: Totals and Per Capita Rates, GOVERNING,
https://www.governing.com/gov-data/public-workforce-salaries/states-most-government
-workers-public-employees-by-job-type.html [https://perma.cc/7WLX-AH6G] (last visited
Oct. 27, 2021).
35
424 U.S. 1 (1976), superseded in part by statute, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
36
Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443,
459–60 (2018).
37
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126; see also Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 880–82 (1991)
(noting as relevant whether the tasks performed are “ministerial” and whether there is a grant
of discretion). See generally Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
38
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124–28.
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The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)—an executive branch office tasked with
interpreting the Constitution39—has interpreted the Buckley standard as both expanding and restricting the original understanding of the term.40 OLC’s determination of
what constitutes a federal office requires: the position is delegated a portion of the
sovereign powers of the Federal Government, which “primarily involve[s] binding
the Government or third parties for the benefit of the public, such as by administering,
executing, or authoritatively interpreting the laws” and “represent[ing] the United
States to foreign nations or [] command[ing] military force on behalf of the Government” but does not involve “purely advisory position[s]” or “typical contractor[s]”;41
and the appointment must be “continuing” and “not personal, ‘transient,’ or ‘incidental,’” which precludes “special diplomatic agents, short-term contractors, qui tam
relators, and many others in positions that have authority on an ad hoc or temporary
basis.”42 In working through this test, OLC has deemed it proper to explore the
statutory basis for the position.43
According to Professor Jennifer Mascott, the post-Buckley Supreme Court and
OLC have expanded the original understanding to include deputies and other agents
as officers that meet the Buckley test, though Founding-Era Congresses did not consider
them officers, and restricted the original understanding by requiring that the duties
that qualify a position as an office render it “significant” enough, though ministerial and
administrative positions were considered offices around the time of the Founding.44
While courts today would likely defer to the long line of Appointments Clause
precedents in defining “officer,”45 Section 3 is wholly separate, and it is possible that
a court would take the opportunity to dig into the original meaning instead. Professor Mascott argues that the original public meaning, at least for the 1787 Constitution, included any person who was legally delegated a portion of the sovereign
powers of either the United States or a state for continuous exercise.46 This standard,
unlike the modern standard,47 does not require that the power delegated allow the
39

See About the Office, DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. OF L. COUNS., https://www.justice.gov/olc
[https://perma.cc/2KH5-H8ZM] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021). See generally Sonia Mittal, OLC’s
Day in Court: Judicial Deference to the Office of Legal Counsel, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
211 (2015).
40
Mascott, supra note 36, at 462 (quoting Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the
Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 86–87 (2007)).
41
Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C.
73, 77 (2007).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 78.
44
Mascott, supra note 36, at 462–70.
45
Id. at 458–60, 462–65, 536–37.
46
Id. at 462–66. Mascott’s analysis is done in the context of the Appointments Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, but there does not appear to be any reason to treat the definition in Article VI
as different from the definition in Article II, or anywhere else in the original Constitution.
47
Id. at 462 (quoting Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause,
31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 86–87 (2007)).
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actor to bind third parties, but also does not include deputies or other agents of officers.48 Indeed, this understanding is in line with an 1867 Supreme Court decision,
United States v. Hartwell,49 that utilized the nature of the position—“embrac[ing]
the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties”—in determining whether a
government position constituted an office.50 These functional ideas were recognized
a decade later in United States v. Germaine,51 where the Court briefly looked at
whether the supposed officer’s duties were “continuing and permanent” and whether
there was a regular appropriation made to pay them.52 Germaine, however, primarily
relied on a simple formal test: did the supposed officer obtain their position in
accordance with the Appointments Clause?53
Using these functionalist and formalist definitions, we can now determine that
the Nation’s most prominent offices—the presidency and vice presidency—are offices under the United States (and that the President and Vice President are officers
of the United States), even though they are not explicitly enumerated.54 First, the
President quite clearly is legally delegated a portion of the sovereign powers of the
United States for continuous exercise,55 so it passes the functionalist test. And second,
the President obtains their office in accordance with the constitutional process for
selecting a person to that office,56 so it passes the formalist test as well.
But some scholars disagree and argue that the President and Vice President are
not officers “of” the United States.57 Professors Josh Blackman and Seth Barrett
48

Id.
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385 (1867).
50
See id. at 393.
51
99 U.S. 508 (1878).
52
See id. at 510–12.
53
See id.
54
The explicitly enumerated positions, on the other hand, are not offices under the United
States. See, e.g., ASHER C. HINDS, 3 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE UNITED STATES 669–79 (1907), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-HPREC
-HINDS-V3/pdf/GPO-HPREC-HINDS-V3.pdf [https://perma.cc/FYS6-6EBH] (rejecting a
resolution that a Member of Congress is “a civil officer of the United States within the meaning
[of the impeachment clause] of the Constitution”); In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890)
(“Although the electors are appointed and act under and pursuant to the Constitution of the
United States, they are no more officers or agents of the United States than are . . . the people
of the States when acting as electors of representatives in Congress.”).
55
Mascott, supra note 36, at 462–66; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall
be vested in a President of the United States of America.”).
56
U.S. CONST. amend. XII. Though the focus in the discussion of the formalist test above
was on the Appointments Clause, that clause is limited to offices whose selection process is not
otherwise provided for in the Constitution. Id. art. II, § 2. The formalist test simply asks if the
person holds an office that they obtained through the constitutionally mandated procedures.
57
See, e.g., Josh Blackman & Seth Barrett Tillman, Is the President an “Officer of the
United States” for Purposes of Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 20, 2021, 12:00 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2021/01/20/is-the-president-an
-officer-of-the-united-states-for-purposes-of-section-3-of-the-fourteenth-amendment/
49
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Tillman note that the “officers of” language appears in the 1787 Constitution four
times—and at least one of which, the Impeachment Clause, admittedly does use
language that facially implies that they are correct. Relying on “the default presumption . . . of linguistic stability, rather than [] linguistic drift,” though acknowledging
the possibility of drift across the near-century separating the original ratification of the
Constitution and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Professors Blackman
and Tillman primarily focus on a number of Appointments Clause precedents to
seemingly derive and export an ultra-formalist test: is the position one that is filled
through appointment by the President, heads of departments, or courts of law?58
This, of course, is a rejection of the broader formalist justification offered above.
Professors Blackman and Tillman also cite for support Senator Booth’s statements
during the William Belknap impeachment and an 1878 treatise, but these appear to
be—at least—matched by evidence that supports the contention that people in 1868
viewed the President as an officer of the United States.59 And Professors Blackman
and Tillman dismiss the “purposivist argument” that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
drafters would not have intended to exclude the presidency in favor of a democracy
canon.60 But that argument does not consider the original public meaning: instead of
questioning whether the drafters intended to include the President, it is proper to question whether the public would have thought the President was immune from this
provision. Even if the drafters “had no pressing reason to draft Section 3’s jurisdictional
[https://perma.cc/CUL3-HQ3J]. See also generally Seth Barrett Tillman, Originalism & the
Scope of the Constitution’s Disqualification Clause, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 59 (2014).
58
Blackman & Tillman, supra note 57 (discussing United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303
(1888), and Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010), and
then noting executive branch reliance on Mouat).
59
Act to Prescribe an Oath of Office, ch. 128, 12 Stat. 502 (1863) (repealed 1868) (“[H]ereafter every person elected or appointed to any office of honor or profit under the government
of the United States, either in the civil, military or naval departments of the public service,
excepting the President of the United States . . . .”); United States ex rel. Stokes v. Kendall,
26 F. Cas. 702, 752 (C.C.D.C. 1837) (No. 15,517) (“The president himself . . . is but an officer
of the United States . . . .”), aff’d 37 U.S. 524 (1838); Gerard Magliocca, Amnesty and Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 93–94 (2021) (citing CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2899 (1866)); S. Journal, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 190 (1824), http://
lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(sj01361)) [https://perma
.cc/Q5AP-799M] (stating that the states’ militias “could not be commanded by a regular officer
of the United States, or other officer than of the militia, except by the President”); President
Andrew Johnson Appoints William W. Holden Provisional Governor of North Carolina,
LOWCOUNTRY DIGIT. HIST. INITIATIVE, https://ldhi.library.cofc.edu/exhibits/show/after_slavery
_educator/unit_one_documents/andrew-appoints-holden [https://perma.cc/B488-7TVY] (last
visited Oct. 27, 2021) (“[T]he President of the United States is, by the constitution, . . . the
chief civil officer.”).
Further, knowing that military officers are included, it should be noted that the President
is the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and may be found to
be within Section 3 on this alternate ground. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
60
Blackman & Tillman, supra note 57.
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element to cover former or future U.S. Presidents,” would the legal community or the
public writ large—were the issue to have come up in the 1872 presidential election—
have welcomed a rebel President? It seems unlikely. While this may be a closer call
than many think, this Article concludes that the President fits within both historical
tests and other contemporary evidence tips in favor of inclusion.
While the Hartwell and Germaine tests may be sufficient to understand who was
classified as an officer of the United States around the time of Section 3’s drafting,
they cannot inform us of the equivalent tests under the several states. For these
analyses, the Attorney General of the United States, in 1867, said that the distinction
between officers and employees of a state was “well established.”61 The Attorney
General cited Chief Justice Tilghman of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in identifying state offices as all those offices created pursuant to the State’s constitution that
were not focused on purely temporary or local concerns.62 Justice Reade of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, in an actual Section 3 case from 1869, provided
what may be the simplest state variant of the formalist test: “I do not know how
better to draw the distinction between an officer and a mere placeman, than by
61

The Reconstruction Acts, 12 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 141, 155–56 (1867). Some have suggested that Congress overruled the Attorney General’s opinion. David P. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 425 (2008) (discussing Act Supplementary to
an Act Entitled “An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States,”
ch. 30, § 10, 15 Stat. 14 (1867)). While it undoubtedly was broadly a rebuke to the Attorney
General’s Reconstruction Act opinion, it does not appear to contradict the “well established”
original meaning of Section 3’s state officers. See ch. 30, § 10, 15 Stat. 14, 16 (1867) (“no
district commander . . . shall be bound in his action by any opinion of any civil officer of the
United States.”). Compare id. § 6 (directing the words “executive or judicial office in any State”
in a Reconstruction Oath, see ch. 6, § 1, 15 Stat. 2 (1867), to “be construed to include all civil
officers created by law for the administration of any general law of a State, or for the administration of justice.”), with Commonwealth v. Sutherland, 3 Serg. & Rawle 145, 149 (Pa.
1817) (“Every thing concerning the administration of justice, or the general interests of society,
may be supposed to be within the meaning of the constitution . . . .”).
62
The Reconstruction Acts, 12 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 141, 155–56 (1867) (citing Sutherland,
3 Serg. & Rawle at 149). Contrary to Professor Currie’s conclusion, it appears that municipal
officers were never “embrac[ed]” by Congress. Currie, supra note 61, at 425. Beyond the
similar language used in Chief Justice Tilghman’s Sutherland opinion and the discussed act—and
the former’s exclusion of municipal offices—the act elsewhere clearly states when municipal
offices are relevant. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979) (discussing the canon
against surplusage); ch. 30, § 2, 15 Stat. 14 (1867); id. § 9; see also The Reconstruction Acts,
12 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 141, 155–56 (1867); The Reconstruction Acts, 12 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen.
182, 203 (1867). Further suggesting the exclusion of municipal officers, in the Fourteenth
Amendment debates, “Executive and Judicial officers of a state”—in Section 2—was chosen,
in part, to remove any ambiguity that suggested municipal offices may be included. See CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2991, 3010, 3037–39 (1866). But see VA. CONST. art. III, § 4
(1868) (including mayors, city councilmembers, and others in the state constitutional adaptation
of Section 3), https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Constitution_of_Virginia/BiAtAQ
AAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&bsq=officer [https://perma.cc/WJ6X-F96A].
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making his oath the test.”63 Other states will have different officers within the constitutional definition thereof, but these serve as a baseline for how one could expect
“an officer of any state” to be interpreted by contemporary actors.
B. Oaths, and Affirmations?
Section 3 explicitly conditions disqualification from public office on “having
previously taken an oath . . . to support the Constitution of the United States.”64 The
Oath as we know it today, however, is not what was used throughout the drafting and
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.65 From 1862 until 1884, the “Ironclad
Oath”66 was used. This required federal civil servants to state, under penalty of perjury:
I, ____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have never voluntarily borne arms against the United States since I have been a
citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily given no aid, countenance,
counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility
thereto; that I have neither sought nor accepted nor attempted to
exercise the functions of any office whatever, under any authority
or pretended authority in hostility to the United States; that I have
not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government, authority, power or constitution within the United States, hostile or
inimical thereto. And I do further swear (or affirm) that, to the best
of my knowledge and ability, I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States, against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same;
that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation
or purpose of evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, so
help me God.67
63

Worthy v. Barrett, 63 N.C. 199, 202 (1869), appeal dismissed sub nom. Worthy v.
Comm’rs 76 U.S. 611 (1869).
64
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
65
Since 1884, the oath of office that federal officers must take—except for the President,
whose oath is prescribed by Article II, Section 1—requires the prospective official to state:
I, ____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take
this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office
on which I am about to enter. So help me God.
5 U.S.C. § 3331; Act of May 13, 1884, ch. 46, 23 Stat. 21.
66
Lawmakers, Loyalty and the “Ironclad Oath,” 1864, U.S. CAPITOL VISITOR CTR., https://
www.visitthecapitol.gov/exhibitions/timeline/lawmakers-loyalty-and-ironclad-oath-1864
[https://perma.cc/2PNV-5N5F] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
67
Act of July 2, 1862, ch. 128, 12 Stat. 502. In addition to federal civil servants, the Ironclad
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Significantly more robust than what was in place prior to the Civil War,68 the
Ironclad Oath was used to punish and deter confederate sympathizers from electing
to hold office because, by doing so, they would be exposed to criminal perjury
charges. More importantly, this oath was used to unconstitutionally exclude people
from office before Section 3 took legal effect.69
Beyond the federal oath, which only applies to federal officials, Section 3 expressly contemplates disqualifying people who had only held state offices and thus
would not have been subject to the federal oath.70 Article VI requires71 that “the Members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers . . . of
the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support [the United
States] Constitution.”72 Thus, many oaths and affirmations relevant for Section 3
would have been administered by the several states.73
Looking back at the text of Section 3, it seems strange that it references only
those “having taken an oath” whereas, in every other constitutional provision on the
matter, the words “Oath or Affirmation” are used.74 Does this mean that those who
solemnly affirm, on their personal honor, are not within Section 3 where those who
solemnly swear to some higher power are? Probably not. When the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified in 1868, every official “oath,” at least federally, had included both oaths and affirmations;75 indeed, from the very first Act of Congress, the
oaths and affirmations required by Article VI have been referred to simply as oaths.76
Oath was also to be administered to all lawyers, a practice that was rendered unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
68
Before the Ironclad Oath, the federal oath of office consisted only of: “I do solemnly
swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of the United States.”
An Act to Regulate the Time and Manner of Administering Certain Oaths, ch. 1, § 1, 1 Stat.
23 (1789).
69
See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521–22 (1969) (disallowing the use of exclusion
proceedings for extraconstitutional conduct-policing).
70
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
71
Some have claimed that certain states did not fully adhere to this requirement. See, e.g.,
In re Griffin, 11 F. Cas. 7, 22, 27 (C.C.D. Va. 1869) (No. 5,815).
72
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
73
See 4 U.S.C. § 101.
74
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3 (“having previously taken an oath . . . to
support the Constitution of the United States”), with U.S. CONST. art I, § 3 (“[Senators] shall
be on Oath or Affirmation” for impeachments); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“[The President]
shall take the following Oath or Affirmation”); U.S. CONST. art. VI (“the Members of the
several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers . . . of the several States,
shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support [the United States] Constitution”).
75
See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.
76
See, e.g., Act of June 1, 1789, ch. 1, § 1, 1 Stat. 23 (affirmation not part of Act title); Act
to Prescribe an Oath of Office, ch. 128, 12 Stat. 502 (1862) (same); An Act Amending the
Revised Statutes of the United States in Respect of Official Oaths, ch. 46, 23 Stat. 21 (1884)
(referring simply to “oaths” rather than “oath or affirmation” throughout).
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So, “taking an oath” to the legal community in the mid- to late-Nineteenth Century
presumably meant having gone through the process of solemnly swearing or affirming to support the United States Constitution as required by Article VI. Consequently,
Section 3 cannot be avoided simply by an officeholder’s choice to affirm rather than
swear to uphold the Constitution.
C. Engaging in Insurrection or Rebellion
Plainly put, active participation in the Confederacy was the impetus77 of including “engaging in insurrection or rebellion” as one of Section 3’s two proscribed
crimes.78 This fact, however, is inapposite to modern Originalist interpretation, which
is primarily concerned with the original public meaning.79 The legal definition of
“engaging in insurrection or rebellion” did not require taking up arms and levying
war against the United States, but came from the militia act of 1795—a predecessor
of the Insurrection Act of 1807—which gave the President certain powers in case
of insurrection or rebellion.80 Per that act—and the Insurrection Act that followed,
which remains as amended on the books today—insurrections and rebellions consisted of either uprising and threatening the government of a state, leading the state’s
legislature to petition for federal intervention,81 or opposing or obstructing the
77
Beyond the Confederacy, the House also briefly discussed the Whiskey Rebellion and
the Burr Trial as the only two other comparable instances in American history. CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2534, 2534 (1866).
78
Whether Section 3 constitutes a punishment was discussed at length in the debates, see,
e.g., id. at 2915, and in Jefferson Davis’s case, see In re Davis, 7 F. Cas. 63 (C.C.D. Va. 1871)
(No. 3,621A). With hindsight, it seems clear that this is a punishment, so it will be discussed
as such.
79
See generally Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary
Originalist Theory 1 (2011) (unpublished manuscript), https://scholarship.law.georgetown
.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2362&context=facpub [https://perma.cc/TTB8-KZME].
80
Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 424); In re Davis, 7 F. Cas. 63, 96 (C.C.D. Va.
1871) (No. 3,621A) (referring, as an attorney for the United States in the treason trial of
Jefferson Davis, to the militia act of 1795 as establishing the test for insurrection or rebellion).
But see The Reconstruction Acts, 12 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 141, 160 (1867) (“The first part of the
sentence covers the case of domestic war existing in form of rebellion or insurrection . . . .”).
The contemporarily authoritative legal dictionary distinguished between different types
of government opposition, stating “insurrection, sedition, rebellion, revolt, and mutiny express action directed against government or authority, while riot has this implication only
incidentally, if at all,” before noting rebellion, insurrection, revolt, and mutiny must be expressions of “actual and open resistance to authority.” Rebellion, 2 BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY
& CONCISE ENCYCL. (Rawles Rev., 1867), https://www.google.com/books/edition/Law_Dic
tionary/CYZOAAAAYAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&bsq=rebellion [https://perma.cc/UYH7-TUSB].
It went on to define insurrection as “an actual arising against the government,” but clarified that
“[r]ebellion goes beyond insurrection in aim.” Id. Rebellions, according to this dictionary,
were attempts to actually overthrow the government, while insurrections sought only minor
changes. Id.
81
Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, § 1, 1 Stat. 424 (“in case of an insurrection in any state”).
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execution of the laws of the United States “by combinations too powerful to be
suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the power vested
in the marshals.”82 In either case, the President must make a proclamation ordering
a cessation of the uprising and “it is only after disobedience to that proclamation”
that it can duly be considered insurrection or rebellion.83
Early drafts of what would become Section 3 were actually limited to the Civil War
itself,84 but by the time of ratification, the language was broadened to insurrection and
rebellion generally.85 Another change in the language from early drafts to the finished
product was the removal of the word “voluntarily.”86 This omission notwithstanding,
Section 3 was understood to contain an implicit voluntariness requirement.87 Therefore,
the Reconstruction Era legal community appears to have understood engaging in
insurrection or rebellion, for the purposes of Section 3, as voluntarily being part of a
combination that is opposing or obstructing the laws of the United States or any State
in a manner too powerful to be suppressed by the justice system, a definition by which
taking up arms or holding office for the confederacy were obviously included.88
82

Id. § 2; Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 25, § 1, 12 Stat. 281 (“rebellion against the authority
of the Government of the United States”); Presidential Proclamation (April 15, 1861); see
also Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 2 (1842) (“Although no State could establish a
permanent military government, yet it may use its military power to put down an armed
insurrection, too strong to be controlled by the civil authority.”).
83
Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, § 3, 1 Stat. 424; Davis, 7 F. Cas. at 96; Martin v. Mott,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 29–32 (1827).
84
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2460 (1866) (“all persons who voluntarily adhered
to the late insurrection, giving it aid and comfort, shall be excluded from the right to vote . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
85
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
86
Compare CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2460 (1866) (“all persons who voluntarily adhered to the late insurrection, giving it aid and comfort, shall be excluded from the
right to vote . . . .”) (emphasis added), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3. The Senate debated
whether to include a voluntariness requirement at length and decided against it. See CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2918–21 (1866).
87
United States v. Powell, 27 F. Cas. 605, 607 (C.C.D.N.C. 1871) (No. 16,709) (“[engaging
in insurrection or rebellion] implies, and was intended to imply, a voluntary effort to assist the
Insurrection or Rebellon [sic] . . . and unless you find the defendant did that, with which he
is charged, voluntarily, and not by compulsion, he is not guilty of the indictment.”); The Reconstruction Acts, 12 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 141, 161 (1867); Privett v. Stevens, 25 Kan. 275,
277–78 (Kan. 1881). But see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2918–21 (1866) (debating
the grounds for objecting to adding “voluntary”).
88
Section 3 could be read as only providing punishment for engaging in insurrection or
rebellion against the United States, and not caring about actions against any particular state.
But the sounder plain-text interpretation seems to be punishing insurrection or rebellion
against the Constitution of the United States, which guarantees to each state a republican form
of government. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Through this interpretation, rebellions or insurrections
recognized by the federal government fall within Section 3, but rebellions or insurrections
recognized only by state governments would not. Cf. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1,
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The modern test of whether an insurrection or rebellion exists is largely the
same, as set by the amended Insurrection Act,89 which is codified in Title 10 of the
U.S. Code, and adds the following:
The President . . . shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection . . . if it—(1) so
hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United
States within the State, that any part of its people is deprived of
a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that
State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or
immunity, or to give that protection; or (2) opposes or obstructs
the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the
course of justice under those laws.90
Before the President can so act, they still must issue a Proclamation, “immediately
order[ing] the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a
limited time.”91 This modern test facially appears to be a simple extension of the
original that allows the President, in declaring an insurrection, to consider the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.92 To utilize this extension, however, some
2 (1849) (state governments, following Presidential inaction, must themselves determine the
appropriate degree of force).
89
Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443; Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 25, § 1, 12 Stat.
281; Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 3, 17 Stat. 13.
90
10 U.S.C. § 253; see also id. §§ 251–52. The criminalization of engaging in such an
insurrection is found in 18 U.S.C. § 2383.
91
10 U.S.C. § 254. This has been done primarily in the civil rights context to enforce
Brown v. Board and to squash race riots. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 3204, 22 Fed. Reg.
7628 (Sept. 23, 1957); Proclamation No. 3795, 32 Fed. Reg. 10905 (July 24, 1967).
92
For examples of when the President has had such authority, regardless of whether it
was invoked, see, e.g., Suppression of Unlawful Organizations in Arizona, 17 U.S. Op. Atty.
Gen. 242 (1881) (discussing the use of force to suppress outlaw activity along the Arizona
territory and Mexico border); Suppression of Lawlessness in Arizona, 17 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen.
333 (1882); President’s Power to Use Federal Troops to Suppress Resistance to Enforcement
of Federal Court Orders—Little Rock, Arkansas, 41 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 313, 326 (1958) (in
response to riots in response to the integration of public schools in Arkansas); Use of Potatoes to Block the Maine-Canada Border, 5 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 422, 426 (1981);
Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States,
2001 WL 36190674 (O.L.C. Oct. 23, 2001).
For a more thorough discussion of the Insurrection Act and its history, see generally
Scott R. Anderson & Michel Paradis, Can Trump Use the Insurrection Act to Deploy Troops to
American Streets? (June 03, 2020, 8:47 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-trump-use
-insurrection-act-deploy-troops-american-streets [https://perma.cc/XHU6-EDLH]; JENNIFER
K. ELSEA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42659, THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT AND RELATED MATTERS:
THE USE OF THE MILITARY TO EXECUTE CIVILIAN LAW (last updated Nov. 6, 2018).
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have suggested it is necessary for the unrest to violate federal law and that mass
unrest that violates only state law could only amount to insurrection if the state’s
legislature requests assistance.93 This possible condition is not explicit in the text of
the Insurrection Act, but comes from the context that its relevant amendments were
enacted in.94 Because this has not been litigated, this Article will not treat it as a
condition and will treat the President’s Proclamation pursuant to the Insurrection
Act as the threshold indicator of whether insurrection or rebellion exists;95 potential
Section 3 respondents may, however, try to invoke this argument as an affirmative
defense that the President’s invocation was invalid.96
D. Giving Aid or Comfort to the Enemy
The second type of conduct proscribed by Section 3 requires “giving aid or
comfort” to “the enemies of the United States.” This prong, with one very important
exception—the omission of any adherence requirement97—is taken from Article III’s
definition of treason,98 which was taken in turn from the English Treason Statute of
1351.99 The English Treason Statute has been understood such that “giving aid and
comfort” consists of “an act which strengthens or tends to strengthen the enemies
of the King in the conduct of a war against the King, or which weakens or tends to
weaken the power of the King and of the country to resist or attack” those
93

See Anderson & Paradis, supra note 92.
See id.
95
See Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 29–32 (1827) (noting that the President
“is necessarily constituted the judge of the existence of the exigency in the first instance”
when deciding whether to invoke the Militia Act of 1795).
96
But see id.
97
See, e.g., Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 30 (1945) (stating that, for treason, “the
indispensable overt act must sustain [] the two elements of the offense as defined: viz.,
adherence and giving aid and comfort.”).
98
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“Treason against the United States, shall consist . . . in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”) (emphasis added); CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2498, 2500 (1866) (providing, in an early draft of Section 3, that “all persons
who voluntarily adhered to the late insurrection, giving it aid and comfort, shall be excluded
from the right to vote”); The Reconstruction Acts, 12 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 141, 160 (1867). It
appears that the difference between “and” and “or” is inconsequential. See id.
99
25 Edw. 3, st. 5, ch. 2 (1351) (“[I]f a man do levy war against our lord the King in his
realm, or be adherent to the King’s enemies in his realm, giving them aid and comfort in the
realm, or elsewhere, . . . [they] ought to be judged [of] Treason[.]”); Carlton F.W. Larson, The
Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 863, 869–73 (2006) (“No provision of the Constitution is as rooted in English legal history
as the Treason Clause.”); Willard Hurst, Treason in the United States, 58 HARV. L. REV. 226,
226 (1944) (“Taking the colonial period as a whole, in most of the colonies the definition of the
offense was clearly thought of in terms of the English legislation. . . .”); see generally Charles
Warren, What is Giving Aid and Comfort to the Enemy?, 27 YALE L.J. 331 (1918) (discussing
the historical origins and understandings of treason by adherence and aid or comfort).
94
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enemies.100 In the context of American treason law, the Supreme Court has stated
that there is “no evidence whatever that . . . aid and comfort was designed to encompass a narrower field than that indicated by its accepted and settled meaning” from
the English Treason Statute.101 This “accepted and settled meaning” meant that “aid
and comfort is given when the enemy is encouraged and his morale bolstered as well
as when materials are furnished.”102
1. Aid or Comfort
Having established that “aid or comfort” was intended to import the tests of the
Treason Clause and old English law—other than the adherence requirement103—is
not itself sufficient to establish what the original public meaning of the clause was,
though the well-established historical background definitely informed such meaning.
Luckily, we have contemporary interpretations from courts and Congress that can
fill any gaps in the historical record. The Fortieth Congress, which directly succeeded the Congress that drafted Section 3, and the Forty-First Congress together
considered at least ten election challenges because of disloyalty.104 Of these, six
were admitted to sit in Congress and four were excluded.105 Taking the most extreme
example, Smith v. Brown showed that an inflammatory letter to a newspaper was all
that was needed as evidence to bar a Representative-Elect from sitting in the Fortieth
100

King v. Casement, 1 K.B. 98 (1917).
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 76 (1945).
102
Id. at 73, 76.
103
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3, with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3; see also ASHER
C. HINDS, 1 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES
443 (1907) [hereinafter 1 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS] (“such acts or speech need not be such as to
constitute treason technically, but must have been so overt and public, and must have been done
or said under such circumstances, as fairly to show that they were actually designed to, and
in their nature tended to, forward the cause of the rebellion.”). But see In re Charge to Grand
Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1036, 1037 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1861) (No. 18,272) (“The words ‘adhering to their
enemies,’” seem to have no special significance, as the substance is found in the words which
follow—“‘giving them aid and comfort.’ . . . In general, when war exists, any act clearly indicating a want of loyalty to the government, and sympathy with its enemies, and which, by
fair construction, is directly in furtherance of their hostile designs, gives them aid and comfort.”).
104
Known House Cases Involving Qualifications for Membership, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Qualifications/Qualifications-for-Member
ship-Cases/ [https://perma.cc/WP23-C34K] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021); U.S. SENATE ELECTION,
EXPULSION, AND CENSURE CASES, 1793–1990 (1994); see infra Sections IV.A.3–B. Of these
ten, only five were adjudicated after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. For the earlier
five, exclusions were made on the grounds of inability to take the Ironclad Oath; regardless,
this Congress included many of the same actors and frequently used language in hearings
that mirrored Section 3 more so than the Ironclad Oath. So, for reasons further discussed
infra Part IV, this Article treats these cases as contemporary evidence of public meaning.
105
Known House Cases Involving Qualifications for Membership, supra note 104; U.S.
SENATE ELECTION, EXPULSION, AND CENSURE CASES, 1793–1990, supra note 104.
101
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Congress.106 In the case of McKee v. Young, also before the Fortieth Congress, it was
said that “aid and comfort may be given to an enemy by words of encouragement,
or the expression of an opinion, from one occupying an influential position.”107
But what does it mean to occupy an influential position? Victor Berger’s publication, the Milwaukee Leader, had roughly 14,000 subscribers when the Espionage
Act revoked its mailing privileges.108 Social media platforms, such as Facebook,
Instagram, and Twitter, are flush with individuals and communities with far more
subscribers than that,109 and a growing number of people utilize these platforms for
news consumption.110 The United Kingdom has recently concluded that having
30,000 followers on a single platform “indicated that [the account owner] had the
attention of a significant number of people” and regulated the account’s posts as if
they were a “celebrity.”111 Digital marketing metrics treat everybody with between
1,000 and 100,000 followers as “micro-influencers.”112 Given that the United States
has roughly three times more people living within its borders than it did when Victor
Berger’s case presented itself, scaling the size of the Milwaukee Leader provides a
workable proxy for being “one occupying an influential position,”113 though this
could be too high of a bar. Consequently, natural cut-offs for Section 3 “influencers”
106

1 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS, supra note 103, at 445.
H.R. REP. NO. 40-29, at 2 (1868) (internal quotation marks omitted).
108
John M. Work, The Leader Among Labor Dailies, 12 LABOR AGE 9 (Oct. 1923), https://
www.marxists.org/history/usa/pubs/laborage/v12n08-oct-1923-LA.pdf [https://perma.cc
/7TJV-9WD4]. Outside of network-based tests of influence, it could be argued that the relevant
influence stems from being an officeholder or from some other reputational basis.
109
Prior to suspension of his account, President Trump alone had more than 88.5 million
followers on Twitter—more than the entire United States’ population in 1900. Twitter ‘Permanently Suspends’ Donald Trump’s Account, CNA (Jan. 9, 2021, 7:35 AM), https://www.chan
nelnewsasia.com/news/world/donald-trump-twitter-account-suspended-realdonaldtrump-13
924784 [https://perma.cc/5C6F-24PS]; National Intercensal Tables: 1900–1990, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/pre-1980-national
.html [https://perma.cc/U7CE-FE4A] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021); U.S. and World Population
Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
110
See Elisa Shearer, Social Media Outpaces Print Newspapers in the U.S. as a News
Source, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/10
/social-media-outpaces-print-newspapers-in-the-u-s-as-a-news-source/ [https://perma.cc/5UVZ
-Z5ZR].
111
ASA Ruling on Sanofi UK in Association with This Mama Life, ADVERT. STANDARDS
AUTH. (July 3, 2019), https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/sanofi-uk-A19-557609.html [https://
perma.cc/JG2H-MVTQ].
112
See, e.g., Kaya Ismail, Social Media Influencers, Mega, Macro, Micro, or Nano, CMS
WIRE (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.cmswire.com/digital-marketing/social-media-influencers
-mega-macro-micro-or-nano/ [https://perma.cc/MM8F-2X5G].
113
Compare NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION OF INHABITANTS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (1920),
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1920/volume-1/41084484v1ch1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5M4L-B32B], with U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/popclock/ [https://perma.cc/JQY2-NE62] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
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could be set at the United Kingdom’s 30,000, the Leader’s 42,000 unique followers
across social media platforms, or even as high as 100,000.114 Or perhaps being a
person of influence is context specific and simply holding office is enough. Unfortunately, contemporaneous litigation leaves the exact delineation unclear.
In other, non-Section-3, Reconstruction-Era contexts: giving aid and comfort
frequently took the form of selling goods or services to the confederacy, even without
doing so for the purpose of aiding the rebel cause.115 People doing as such “cannot
be permitted to stand on the nice metaphysical distinction that, although he knows
that the purchaser buys the goods for the purpose of aiding the [enemy cause], he
does not sell them for that purpose. . . . [They] must be taken to intend the consequences of [their] own voluntary act.”116 This is easier to conceptualize as providing
aid and comfort than the general speech-type acts of Young or Brown because, by the
action of providing goods or services to the enemy, the enemy is directly and tangibly
benefitting unlike the abstract and intangible benefit gained from speech acts.
Modern-day inclinations regarding freedom of speech or enterprise notwithstanding, these examples—writing a letter as an influential person, selling goods, or
providing services—of contemporary applications of the “aid or comfort” language
reinforce the idea that the legal community understood it as they understood the
treason-context parallel. After all, in the treason context, “aid and comfort is given
when the enemy is encouraged and his morale bolstered as well as when materials
are furnished,”117 and the above examples neatly fit within that test.
2. Enemies of the United States
Aid and comfort can be provided without penalty, so long as the beneficiary is
not among the enemies of the United States.118 Outside of Section 3, the only
constitutional mention of enemies is in the Treason Clause.119 Outside of the Constitution, prize cases rely on their own definition of enemies and multiple statutes
define who the United States’ enemies are,120 but the earliest of those statutes was
114

Using followers as a metric for influence based on a comparison to the world as it
existed from Reconstruction through the First World War is flawed insofar as modern-day
platforms allow for instantaneous sharing and resharing, and thus increased influence from
any given speech act, but without a better proxy this test will have to work.
115
See, e.g., Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. 147 (1872) (holding that British subjects
residing in the United States were not entitled to compensation for property seized by Union
soldiers under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act because they sold goods to the confederacy, and thus gave them aid and comfort). Like the Captured and Abandoned Property
Act, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 820 (1863), the Court of Claims Act of 1868 also had provisions regarding the giving of aid or comfort. ch. 71, § 3, 15 Stat. 75 (1868).
116
Carlisle, 83 U.S. at 151.
117
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 73 (1945).
118
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
119
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
120
See 50 U.S.C. § 4302 (1918) (“(a) Any individual, . . . of any nationality, resident
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enacted in the context of the First World War121—a full fifty years after Section 3’s
ratification.122 Consequently, the only indicators of the contemporary understanding
of who comprises the enemies of the United States come from treason prosecutions
and maritime disputes.
Justice Field, serving as a circuit justice in 1863, interpreted enemies in the
treason context “according to its settled meaning at the time the constitution was
adopted, appl[ying] only to the subjects of a foreign power in a state of open hostility with us.”123 Relying on the English common law, he went on to state “[a]n
enemy is always the subject of a foreign power who owes no allegiance to our
government or country.”124 Indeed, this view was dominant in the legal community
for interpreting enemies in the treason context prior to the Fourteenth Amendment.125 In the prize context, however, the Supreme Court noted that “[u]nder the
very peculiar Constitution” of the United States, “States claiming to be sovereign over
all persons and property within their respective limits” were “asserting a right to
absolve their citizens from their allegiance to the Federal Government” by organizing their rebellion.126 Because of this peculiarity, “all persons residing within [the
confederacy] . . . [were] liable to be treated as enemies, though not foreigners. They
have cast off their allegiance and made war on their Government, and are none the
less enemies because they are traitors.”127
Because, as noted above, Section 3 is an adaptation of the Treason Clause, one
may assume that the treason definition of enemies was adopted by the Thirty-Ninth
Congress, to the exclusion of the prize definition.128 There is reason, however, to
within the territory . . . of any nation with which the United States is at war, or resident outside
the United States and doing business within such territory, and any corporation incorporated
within such territory . . . or incorporated within any country other than the United States and
doing business within such territory. (b) The government of any nation with which the
United States is at war, or any political or municipal subdivision thereof, or any officer . . .
thereof. (c) Such other individuals . . . as may be natives, citizens, or subjects of any nation
with which the United States is at war, other than citizens of the United States, . . . as the
President . . . may . . . include within the term ‘enemy.’”); 50 U.S.C. § 2204 (1996) (“[A]ny
country, government, group, or person that has been engaged in hostilities, whether or not
lawfully authorized, with the United States.”).
121
See 50 U.S.C. § 4302 (1917).
122
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
123
United States v. Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. 18, 22 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863) (No. 15,254).
124
Id.
125
See, e.g., The Reconstruction Acts, 12 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 141, 160–61 (1867);
Larson, supra note 99, at 869–73.
126
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 673 (1862) (emphasis omitted).
127
Id. at 674. The Prize Cases, however, were not resolved on these grounds. The Supreme
Court noted that the term “enemies’ property” was a technical phrase “peculiar to prize courts”
and declared that “[t]he owner, pro hac vice, is an enemy.” Id.
128
See Larson, supra note 99, at 919–20 (arguing that the Prize Cases did not represent
a departure from historic understandings of enemies in the treason context but instead was
being interpreted in an international law of prizes context).
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doubt this assumption. First, Congress frequently referred to the confederates as
enemies and directly, although briefly, cited to the Prize Cases to justify treating the
Confederacy as conquered enemies.129
Second, the Attorney General in 1867 said “although [he] strongly incline[d] to
think that the aid and comfort here mentioned should strictly be confined to its
acknowledged legal interpretation, [he was] not quite prepared to say that Congress
may not have used it as applicable to the rebellion,” because “for certain purposes
and in a certain sense, every citizen in the rebel States, during the late rebellion,
[wa]s to be considered a public enemy.”130 Further, in an apparent confirmation of
the Attorney General’s suspicions, all but one of the congressionally adjudicated
Section 3 disputes and the few judicial applications of Section 3 were centered
around the Civil War.131 If Congress was utilizing the pure Treason Clause definition
of enemies, the confederacy—as a domestic entity—could not have been an enemy
and aiding or comforting it could not trigger Section 3.
Assuming Congress adopted the Supreme Court’s stance on enemies from the
then-recently decided landmark Prize Cases, on the other hand, would explain this
departure in practice. At the very least, Congress’s actions in adjudicating Section
3 challenges show that the legal community began to understand that domestic
actors could also be enemies, at least if operating under the sovereignty of a rebelling state government.132 This shift implies that prize case definitions of enemies do
inform understandings of Section 3, even if they do not inform understandings of
the Treason Clause.133
It is clear then that there were two contemporary understandings of who was an
enemy of the United States: first, subjects of a foreign power “in a state of open
hostility” with the United States;134 and second, subjects of a rebelling domestic state
that has taken arms against the United States.135 But what is “a state of open hostility”?
While it may be obvious that such a state is “characterized by armed conflict,”136 the
129

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2536 (1866).
The Reconstruction Acts, 12 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 141, 160–61 (1867).
131
See infra Part IV.
132
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 673. But see Larson, supra note 99, at 919. This
does not mean that the typical American insurrectionist or rebel—i.e., not acting under a de
facto sovereign government that is at war with the United States—can be labelled an enemy.
133
It is very possible that the Fourteenth Amendment implicitly amended the definition of
enemies in the Treason Clause as it implicitly amended—through “reverse incorporation”—
much of the Bill of Rights, but that is beyond the scope of this Article.
Further support for this argument can be found by looking at the modern oath of office,
which explicitly requires “support[ing] and defend[ing] the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (emphasis added).
134
United States v. Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. 18, 22 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863) (No. 15,254).
135
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 673.
136
United States v. McCrary, 1 C.M.A. 1, 8 (1951) (Brosman, J., concurring).
130
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actual boundary-lines are more difficult to conjure because treason prosecutions
have historically arisen only where it was very clear who our enemies were. During
the Quasi-War between the United States and France,137 the Supreme Court considered the question in the prize case of Bas v. Tingy.138 Recognizing the exchanges of
force upon the high seas, Justice Moore asked “by what other word the . . . situation
of America and France could be communicated, than by that of hostility, or war?
And how can the characters of the parties engaged in hostility or war, be otherwise
described than by the denomination of enemies?”139 Justice Washington distinguished between “perfect” and “imperfect” wars on the basis of whether there were
limitations as to the hostilities authorized in the dispute, labelling the Quasi-War as
the latter.140 To Justice Washington, stopping trade with France and commissioning
American ships to attack and take as prize French ships could lead to only one
conclusion: “They certainly were not friends, because there was a contention by
force; nor were they private enemies, because the contention was external, and
authorised by the legitimate authority of two governments. If they were not our
enemies, I know not what constitutes an enemy.”141 Justice Chase, largely agreeing
with the above sentiments, said “Congress has not declared war in general terms; but
congress has authorised hostilities on the high seas by certain persons in certain
cases. . . . So far it is, unquestionably, a partial war; but, nevertheless, it is a public
war, on account of the public authority from which it emanates.”142 This reinforces
the idea that a formal declaration of war is not required but also shows that there
must be some public authority for the uses of force.143
As noted above, the original understanding of who constituted enemies of the
United States centered around authorized uses of force with additional consideration
being given to the state of diplomatic relations between the United States and the
hostile party.144 Our “enemies” were never defined formulaically and “I shall not
today attempt further to define the kinds of [actors] I understand to be embraced
137

See generally, e.g., The XYZ Affair and the Quasi-War with France, 1798–1800, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/xyz [https://perma.cc/F429
-3VSK] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
138
4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
139
Id. at 39 (opinion of Moore, J.) (emphasis omitted).
140
Id. at 40 (opinion of Washington, J.).
141
Id. at 41.
142
Id. at 43 (opinion of Chase, J.).
143
This public authority need not be a congressional declaration of war nor maybe even
an explicit authorization for the use of military force, because “[u]nder the Constitution Congress
has the power to declare war, but with the army and navy the President can take action such as
to involve the country in war and to leave Congress no option but to . . . recognize its existence.”
United States v. Anderson, 17 C.M.A. 588, 591 (1968) (Kilday, J., concurring) (quoting
President Taft).
144
Tingy, 4 U.S. at 41 (opinion of Washington, J.).
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within that shorthand description [because] perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.”145 But, much like Justice Stewart and pornography, “[we] know
it when [we] see it.”146 Or at least we used to.
With the advent of the United Nations, the increased weaponization of the
global economy, the seemingly never-ending state of quasi-war with amorphous
groups whose alliances fluctuate, and the change from human- to machine-centric
warfare, it is harder than ever to tell who our enemies are. The United States has
been in an on-off cold war with Russia for decades, there has been a multi-year
“trade war” with China, kinetic and cyber attacks have publicly and privately been
exchanged with Iran, and North Korea has been exhaustingly threatening nuclear
annihilation for years.147 Then there are the non-state actors: the Islamic State, the
Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the like.148 In the past, the United States has openly intervened to overthrow despotic or communist regimes in South America and Asia
despite, in some instances, never sending a single soldier.149 Not all of these state and
non-state actors, however, are—or were—our enemies because the United States
never entered into a “state of open hostilities.”150
In Bas v. Tingy, Justice Washington made clear that, for a state of open hostilities to exist, the actions taken must be “authorised by the legitimate authority of two
governments.”151 Justice Washington also made clear that “contention by force”
categorically constitutes hostilities.152 What the Tingy Court did not address, however, is what the Center for Strategic and International Studies calls “the Gray
Zone,” which includes information operations, political coercion, economic coercion, cyber operations, proxy support, and provocation by state-controlled Forces.153
These provocations, designed to further a state’s interests at the cost of a geopolitical
rival without triggering escalation, fall “somewhere between routine statecraft and
145

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id.
147
See generally Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, OFFICE
OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, 2021.
148
Id.
149
See, e.g., Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs: The Counterrevolutionaries (“The
Contras”), BROWN UNIV., https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra
_Affair/n-contras.php [https://perma.cc/9VNW-88HZ] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021); U.S. Relations
with Iran, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-iran-1953
-2021 [https://perma.cc/PML3-6BJ6] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
150
See Tingy, 4 U.S. at 41 (opinion of Washington, J.).
151
Id. Presumably, the second “government” in the case of non-state actors is simply whoever
is in charge. See Larson, supra note 99, at 916 (citing 4 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES at
*83) (labelling pirates as enemies). But Tingy did not have a chance to address the non-state
-actor question.
152
Tingy, 4 U.S. at 41 (opinion of Washington, J.).
153
See, e.g., Gray Zone Project, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, https://www.csis
.org/grayzone [https://perma.cc/243M-PFBB] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
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open warfare”154 and it is still an open question whether the existence of such backand-forth actions would qualify as open hostilities.
E. Removing the Disability
The simplest of the components of Section 3 is the provision allowing for the
removal of the disability it imposes. Section 3 states that “Congress may by a vote
of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.”155 This has been done numerous times, some aimed at individuals and others aimed at large groups of people.156
This culminated in the General Amnesty Act of 1872, which removed Section 3’s
disqualification “from all persons whomsoever” with four exceptions that are irrelevant
here, and an 1898 universal amnesty act.157 The original understanding was plainly that
Congress could, by two-thirds vote, remove Section 3’s disqualification from individuals or classes of people. Notably, the only invocation of Section 3 not contemporary
to its drafting resulted in a future Congress completely ignoring this component of
Section 3 by allowing somebody previously excluded to sit as a Member.158
II. THE TEST AND ITS APPLICATION
With a provision as powerful and as politically wieldable as Section 3—one that
can be used to disqualify people from holding office on claims of disloyalty to the
United States—it is of paramount importance to make sure that it is neutrally enforced.159 Though the irony should not be lost in remembering that the initial test was
anything but neutral. Should the test be perceived as biased, prudence would require
decision makers to exercise Thayerian levels of self-restraint,160 or else all legitimacy
could be lost outside the extraordinary circumstances surrounding its ratification.
It has been established as a threshold issue that Section 3 was not voided by the amnesty acts of 1872 or 1898, nor did it substantively expire the day the last confederate
died.161 Second, no person is disqualified after forgiveness from two thirds of each
154

See, e.g., id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
156
James A. Rawley, Note, The General Amnesty Act of 1872, 47 MISS. VALLEY HIST.
REV. 480, 482 (1960) (“Congress, by individual acts, relieved numerous southerners of disability in the years preceding the Amnesty Act of 1872.”).
157
Act of May 22, 1872, ch. 193, 17 Stat. 142; Act of June 6, 1898, ch. 389, 30 Stat. 432.
158
See infra Section IV.G.
159
See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
160
See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). This level of restraint, outside of the judicial review
of statutes, would likely see decisionmakers not disqualify an official on Section 3 grounds
unless their conduct was clearly treasonous. In other words, decisionmakers would be counseled
to refrain themselves if there was the slightest ambiguity as to the merits of disqualification.
161
CLARENCE CANNON, 6 CANNON’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
155
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chamber of Congress.162 These are non-controversial. The challenges come with
determining who is an officer and whether somebody “engaged in insurrection or
rebellion” or has “given aid or comfort to the enemies” of the United States.163
A. Officers of the United States and the Several States
Regardless of the proper scope of an office under the United States for Appointments Clause purposes, which is fact-laden and difficult to predict ex ante,164 Section
3 is primarily concerned with the officers themselves.165 There are two different
contemporaneously developed tests to determine who is an officer of the United
States: the functionalist Hartwell test and the formalist Germaine test.
Under the formalist test, a decision maker can usually skip over whether the
position is properly classified as an office and look to the structural test of whether
the supposed officer was appointed as an officer: if somebody was appointed by the
President, the head of an executive department, or the courts of law166 to a continuing position created by law, then they are an officer of the United States.167 And if
somebody took an oath to support the Constitution pursuant to Article VI for their
state position, then they are an officer of their state.168 This especially makes sense
for classifying preconditional positions, accepting the general idea behind Section
3 was “that one who had taken an oath to support the Constitution and violated it,
ought to be excluded from taking it again, until relieved by Congress.”169
Defaulting to the formalist test is supported by contemporary interpretation of
Section 3. The simple rule of Worthy v. Barrett is that:
[There is no better way] to draw the distinction between an officer and a mere placeman, than by making his oath the test. Every
officer is required to take . . . an oath to support the Constitution
UNITED STATES 53, 58 (1935) [hereinafter CANNON ON PRECEDENTS] (internal
citations omitted).
162
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
163
Id.
164
See generally Mascott, supra note 36.
165
See id.
166
Courts of law, post-Freytag, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), seem to include Article I tribunals
as well as Article III courts.
167
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 5 (1976), superseded in part by statute, The Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81. As noted in Section I.A, the
President, who is selected by a different constitutional procedure is also likely an officer.
168
Worthy v. Barrett, 63 N.C. 199, 204–05 (1869), appeal dismissed sub nom. Worthy v.
Comm’rs 76 U.S. 611 (1869).
169
Id.; see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2899 (1866) (“I understood the
purpose . . . to be to exclude the men who violated their oath of office . . ., who added moral
perjury to the crime of violating their allegiance.”).
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of the State and of the United States. Whereas every mere placeman is simply required to take an oath to perform the particular
duty required of him . . . and takes no oath to support the Constitution of the State, or of the United States.170
Where this formalist test is not satisfied, the challenger would likely invoke the
functionalist test to have the courts establish the position is, in fact, an office. And
a respondent to a Section 3 challenge may have an affirmative defense if they can
show, via the functionalist test, that they were not an officer despite the formalities.
But as always, relevant state supreme court decisions as to which offices in a state
meet the constitutional definition must be consulted for state challenges.
B. Engaging in Insurrection or Rebellion
As noted above, the original accepted legal definition of “engaging in insurrection or rebellion” did not require taking up arms and levying war against the United
States, but simply opposing or obstructing the execution of the laws of the United
States or any state “by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings, or by the power vested in the marshals.”171 The
limiting effect of “too powerful to be suppressed” by the justice system ensures that
standard acts of peaceful protest and civil disobedience designed to show opposition
to or hinder execution of supposedly unjust laws could not trigger such extreme
consequences.172 Further, the voluntariness requirement guarantees that people will
not be unjustly disqualified for participating in an uprising or other conflict against
a state or the United States under duress.173
Insurrection and rebellion have high bars that, in light of the Proclamation requirement, should be obvious enough and Section 3 should be easy to apply to those
engaged in them. Though the President has sent federal troops to quell insurrections
without proclamations and without apparent statutory bases,174 it is hard to believe
that a court (or Congress) would allow for a deprivation of somebody’s right to hold
public office according only to the President’s subjective and secretive assertion.175
170

Worthy, 63 N.C. at 202.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
172
See Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 25, § 1, 12 Stat. 281.
173
See The Reconstruction Acts, 12 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 141, 161 (1867).
174
See generally ELSEA, supra note 92.
175
It should be noted that “[t]he President of the United States is the exclusive judge whether
the exigencies have arisen in which he is authorized to call forth the militia of the Union,”
and “[i]t is not necessary in such a case that it should appear . . . that the exigency actually
existed. It is sufficient that the President has determined it, and all other persons are bound by
his decision.” Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 29, 32 (1827). But this exclusive authority
is vested by the Insurrection Act and its predecessor, and the proclamation requirement prevents
171
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A basis in law, which requires a Proclamation, should then underlie a Section 3 challenge on the basis of insurrection or rebellion. The test, then, is basically: if somebody voluntarily takes part in a scheme that causes such domestic unrest that the
President issues a Proclamation pursuant to the Insurrection Act and calls in the
National Guard or other military forces to suppress their scheme, then they have
engaged in insurrection or rebellion and could be disqualified by Section 3.176
Some may worry that this test could possibly capture people that participate in
“mostly peaceful” mass protest movements that become violent and, in effect,
suppress civil rights activists. An alternative test could be more formalist: the disqualification only attaching to those who have been adjudged guilty under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2383.177 But this alternative is not ideal.178 It also does not consider federally
recognized rebellion or insurrection against states.
C. Giving Aid or Comfort to the Enemies of the United States
1. Aid or Comfort
In more of a gray area than engaging in insurrection or rebellion is speaking or
acting in a manner that constitutes aid or comfort. Providing goods and services is
giving aid or comfort.179 That is clear enough. But what about “making a speech critical
of the government or opposing its measures, profiteering, striking in defense plants or
essential work, and the hundred other things which impair our cohesion and diminish
our strength”180 as “one occupying an influential position”?181 This is harder to apply.
When is “making a speech critical of the government or opposing its measures”182 disqualifying under Section 3, and when is it the simple political speech
that fundamental American principles immunize?183 One answer would be to use the
Sixtieth Congress’s language and label speech as aid or comfort when “willfully
its secretive invocation. Id. at 31. And abuse of this power—either by invoking the Insurrection
Act without justification or not invoking it when doing so would be justified—is remediable
by impeachment. Id. at 32.
176
But see Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 2 (1842) (contemplating the arrest by
law enforcement of people “engaged in [] insurrection” without a presidential proclamation).
177
Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, § 2, 12 Stat. 589.
178
There does not appear to be a single person ever convicted under this provision, so it
is as much a gray area as Section 3.
179
See, e.g., Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 151 (1872).
180
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 29 (1945).
181
See supra Section I.D.1.
182
Cramer, 325 U.S. at 29.
183
See, e.g., Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 680 (1972) (prohibiting loyalty oaths
requiring “that one has not engaged, or will not engage, in protected speech activities such
as []: criticizing institutions of government; discussing political doctrine that approves the
overthrow of certain forms of government; and supporting candidates for political office.”).
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hinder[ing], obstruct[ing], and embarrass[ing] the Government of the United States.”184
This would impute voluntariness and mens rea elements into the test: if the intent
of the speech act is to further discussion on the merits of a government policy or it
is taken out of context, then it would not be giving aid or comfort, but if it is said
with the intent to sow discord, create disunity, or undermine the government, then
it would be giving aid or comfort. This mens rea test cannot be justified by reliance
on the original text of Section 3, which is steeped in a disregard for speech protections,185 but at least one of the contemporary cases—that of Lawrence Trimble186—
and part of the discussion from United States v. Powell187 provide a sound basis for
it. Further, recognizing Section 3 as a constitutional crime188 may provide justification
for requiring at least some mens rea.
2. Enemies of the United States
Part of the reason that the enemies of the United States are so hard to define is
that it has historically been a political question.189 This makes sense, given that declaring a nation or organization as an enemy of the United States has been perceived
as “tantamount to a declaration of war.”190 “Such a determination therefore raises
thorny questions of foreign relations that the text of the Constitution squarely
commits to the political branches . . . . [And is] particularly inappropriate for judicial
resolution.”191 This means—at least where Section 3 actions are brought by either
the Department of Justice or Congress—the test, at least superficially, appears to be
whether the challenge is brought. If the Department of Justice brings a Section 3
challenge to somebody’s title for office under the aid or comfort test, that is the
executive branch labelling the group in question as an enemy and the courts could
abstain from weighing in one way or the other under Baker v. Carr.192 If Congress
brings a Section 3 challenge against a congressperson-elect’s qualification for office
under the aid-or-comfort test, that is the legislative branch labelling the group in
question as an enemy and the courts have no ability to hear challenges relating to the
qualifications of Members of Congress.193
184

CANNON ON PRECEDENTS, supra note 161, at 58.
See generally infra Part IV.
186
See infra Section IV.A.3.
187
27 F. Cas. 605 (C.C.D.N.C. 1871) (No. 16,709).
188
As noted, the drafting Congress was split as to whether Section 3 was a punishment.
And while the question is technically open, it makes more sense to think of disqualification as
a sort of punishment for the constitutional crime of “disloyalty.” See supra note 77.
189
See Larson, supra note 99, at 920–21.
190
See id. at 921.
191
See id. (internal citations omitted).
192
See generally 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
193
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. While Powell v. McCormack involved a challenge to congressional discretion under Section 5, its conclusion was simply that “Congress is limited to the
185
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However, as established above, Section 3’s aid or comfort test was taken from
the Treason Clause, which is squarely within Article III.194 Consequently, it would
seem absurd to classify any of the elements of that crime as nonjusticiable. To exemplify how absurd this would be: President Trump called media companies
“ENEM[IES] OF THE PEOPLE!”195 Could working for CNN plausibly be treasonous or disqualify somebody from office?
One way to address the political question without delegating the issue entirely
is the jury trial. In old English treason law, enemy status was “purely a question of
fact, triable by the jury.” The Crown would simply aver that they were an enemy
and “public notoriety [was] sufficient evidence of it.”196 So, if the Department of
Justice brings a Section 3 challenge to somebody’s title for office under the aid-orcomfort test, that is the executive branch labelling the group in question as an enemy
and a jury may decide—as a matter of fact, not law—whether they are.
For judgments as a matter of law, though, we can adapt Professor Carlton Larson’s
attempt, in the treason context, to strike a balance between the political question
problem and the abuse of power problem: first, “the asserted ‘enemy’ [must] at least
conform[] to the traditional requirement[s]” of an enemy; second, “the assertion
[must be] supported by other actions of the political departments”; and third, “[a]s
a basic matter of due process, individuals [must] have some sort of notice as to what
groups will be considered enemies . . . [and] the declaration of enemy status cannot
come in the indictment itself.”197 This test allows the political branches flexibility
to consider foreign relations implications and evolving standards of hostilities while
protecting Americans from weaponization of the deference that normally comes
with political questions.
III. HOW SECTION 3 WORKS
This Part will explore the actual mechanics of a Section 3 challenge. This is
uniquely complicated due to Section 3’s broad applicability and constitutional barriers maintaining separation of powers and federalism. For example, Section 3 can
standing qualifications prescribed in the Constitution,” and such a determination as to one
of those standing qualifications is final. 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969).
194
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
195
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TRUMP TWITTER ARCHIVE (Apr. 5, 2019, 1:41
PM), https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?dates=%5B%222019-04-05%22%2C%222019-04
-06%22%5D&results=1 [https://perma.cc/PRD6-VH7C].
196
Treason and Rebellion 38 (Towne & Bacon 1863) (quoting 1 Sir Matthew Hale, Pleas
of the Crown 163–64 (1736)), https://www.google.com/books/edition/Treason_and_Rebel
lion/s8zrYc55m6EC?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA38&printsec=frontcover [https://perma.cc/6FTY
-LFCA]; 1 Sir Matthew Hale, Pleas of the Crown 163–64 (1736), http://lawlibrary.wm.edu
/wythepedia/library/HaleHistoryOfThePleasOfTheCrown1736Vol1.pdf [https://perma.cc
/VHS7-SH72].
197
Larson, supra note 99, at 923.
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disqualify somebody from becoming a Member of Congress, but the courts have no
jurisdiction to enforce that disqualification, even though they do have the power to
enforce a disqualification of a federal officer.198
As a reminder, every officer under the United States and of the several States,
and Member of Congress, whether elected or appointed, is subject to disqualification
by Section 3.199 Disqualification can happen in a multitude of ways: a declared candidate for elected office could be prevented from being placed on the ballot; a
candidate-elect could be prevented from taking the oath of office; or an official
could be removed from their office. The process of seeking disqualification in these
ways, however, will vary according to the type of office at issue. Consequently, this
Part will proceed by separating Section 3 challenges into three jurisdictional groups—
the states, the federal government, and Congress—and then discuss how somebody
could find themselves on the wrong side of Section 3 within that jurisdiction.
A. State Office Challenges
Officers of the states—as discussed in Section I.A—will be classified as such on
a state-by-state basis and may not be identical in form to those of the United States.
Paths into office vary among states, precluding reliance on a single pathway: i.e., officers that would be appointed in some states will be elected in others. This Section
will proceed by breaking down the procedures for challenges to state offices into three
different temporal groups: before election/appointment; after election/appointment;
and after assumption of office. Further work would be needed to establish a truly
comprehensive guide to navigating procedural and jurisdictional issues in challenging
the qualifications of candidates in each state, but to establish some basic jurisdictional points, this Section will focus on Indiana.
1. Pre-Election/Appointment
While a fifty-state survey on the exact procedures of running for office is
beyond the scope of this Article, a person running for a state office typically files
their candidacy with the state government’s secretary of state or board of
elections.200 Doing so is an affirmation that you are qualified for the office you seek,
and you will be placed on the ballot, assuming the administrative requirements have
been satisfied.201 What if, however, you are not actually qualified?
198

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5; id. amend. XIV, § 3.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
200
See, e.g., 2021 Candidate Qualifying Guide, MISS. SEC’Y OF STATE, https://www.sos
.ms.gov/Elections-Voting/Pages/Candidate-Qualifying-Forms.aspx [https://perma.cc/ALV9
-8PWA] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021); Candidate Forms, VA. DEP’T OF ELECTIONS, https://www
.elections.virginia.gov/candidatepac-info/candidate-forms/ [https://perma.cc/7PXW-YWYA]
(last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
201
See, e.g., 2021 Candidate Qualifying Guide, MISS. SEC’Y OF STATE, https://www.sos
199

2021]

DISLOYALTY & DISQUALIFICATION

185

In that case, a challenger can petition the certifying body alleging your disqualification and, if successful, prevent your name from being placed on the ballot come
election day.202 Unsurprisingly, this process also varies by state. Because of that,
there is not a uniform way to challenge somebody’s qualifications under Section 3.
Some states make it very easy: Indiana has a specialized form for challenging people’s
candidacy.203 Others are slightly more difficult: New Hampshire requires challengers
to submit written objections with sworn affidavits to the Ballot Law Commission
under the New Hampshire Secretary of State.204 Others are more challenging still:
Florida requires that these challenges be adjudicated by the courts through mandamus proceedings.205
Turning to our example state, Indiana, pre-election challenges can be levied
through title 3, chapter 8 of the Indiana Code.206 This chapter allows individuals who
are registered to vote in the district that the candidate is running in to challenge the
candidate’s qualifications by filing a sworn statement with the Indiana Election
Division, no later than seventy-four days before the election, that sets forth the facts
known to the voter justifying disqualification.207 Within three days, they must hold
a hearing for the challenge208 and announce its determination no later than one day
afterwards.209 The losing party may then appeal that determination to the Indiana
.ms.gov/Elections-Voting/Pages/Candidate-Qualifying-Forms.aspx [https://perma.cc/ALV9
-8PWA] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
202
See, e.g., N.H. BALLOT COMM’N, WRITTEN DECISION 2015-2, https://sos.nh.gov/elec
tions/elections/ballot-law-commission/2015-2016-ballot-law-commission/ [https://perma.cc
/T3NS-QR8K] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021) (denying the challenger’s petition to remove Ted
Cruz from the Presidential ballot).
203
See Candidate Filing Challenge State Form 46437, IND. ELECTION DIV., https://forms
.in.gov/Download.aspx?id=9438 [https://perma.cc/H4PE-FFNS] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
204
N.H. REV. STAT. § 665:6. For an example of such a written objection, see, e.g., N.H.
BALLOT COMM’N, Written Decision 2015-2, https://sos.nh.gov/elections/elections/ballot-law
-commission/2015-2016-ballot-law-commission/ [https://perma.cc/T3NS-QR8K] (last visited
Oct. 27, 2021) (relating to a challenge of Ted Cruz’s qualifications to be President of the United
States); see also Candidate Challenges, N.C. ST. BD. OF ELECTIONS, https://www.ncsbe.gov
/candidates/candidate-challenges [https://perma.cc/EG52-3QEQ] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021)
(showing North Carolina operates in a similar way).
205
SUPERVISOR’S HANDBOOK ON CANDIDATE QUALIFYING, FL. DEP’T OF ST. DIV. OF ELECTIONS 6 (2018) (“Any question as to a candidate’s eligibility becomes a judicial question if
and when an appropriate challenge is made in the courts.”) (citing State ex rel. Shevin v.
Stone, 279 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1972)), https://soe.dos.state.fl.us/pdf/soe-handbook-on-candidate
-qualifying-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YBL-32X7].
206
This chapter applies to both people seeking election to legislative offices and executive
offices but does not apply to judicial offices. IND. CODE § 3-8-8-1. Further, a candidate cannot
be challenged if they were successful against a previous challenge on “substantially the same
grounds.” IND. CODE § 3-8-8-2.
207
Id. § 3-8-8-3; see Candidate Filing Challenge State Form 46437, supra note 203.
208
IND. CODE § 3-8-8-4.
209
Id. § 3-8-8-5.
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court of appeals for errors of law “under the same terms, conditions, and standards
that govern appeals in ordinary civil actions.”210 But “[r]egardless of the status of a
challenge before the commission or the court of appeals,” the challenged candidate’s
name may not be removed from the ballot sixty days before the election.211 As a
preview of the next Section, if the challenged candidate ends up winning the
election and is later determined to be disqualified by law, then the office will be
considered vacant and will be filled as otherwise provided by law.212
As noted, Indiana is a state that makes bringing a challenge particularly easy.
The specialized form and clearly defined process may not exist in other states, but
the general idea is the same: before an election takes place, voters can seek to prevent their state from placing the challenged candidate’s name on the ballot; if the
challenger succeeds in convincing the relevant decision maker (whether executive,
administrative, or judicial) that the challenged candidate violated Section 3, then
their name will be stricken and the election will proceed without them.
There does not, on the other hand, appear to be a method of preemptively
challenging an appointment of a person to a state office that satisfies ripeness.213
2. Post-Election/Appointment, Pre-Assumption of Office
After an election has taken place, or after an appointment has been made,
challenges to prevent officer-elects/appointees from taking office have a less-clear
path. Typically, the only actor standing between the officer-elect/appointee and
assumption of office is an actor many may expect has purely ministerial duties: the
persons tasked with swearing said officer-elect/appointee into office and issuing
their commission.214 As with above, a full fifty-state survey is beyond the scope of
this Article, but there does appear to be recourse in at least some states. The proper
course of action for a challenge at this stage is likely a petition for a writ of mandamus to prevent the swearing in and commissioning of the officer-elect/appointee.215
Alternatively, state officials tasked with swearing in newly elected or appointed
officers may be able to come to a determination themselves, at which point the
officer-elect/appointee would need to seek mandamus to compel their swearing in.216
210

Id. § 3-8-8-6.
Id. § 3-8-8-7.
212
Id. § 3-8-8-8.
213
See generally Candidate Filing Challenge State Form 46437, supra note 203.
214
See Worthy v. Barrett, 63 N.C. 199, 200 (1869), appeal dismissed sub nom. Worthy
v. Comm’rs 76 U.S. 611 (1869).
215
See, e.g., State ex rel Shevin v. Stone, 279 So. 2d 17, 22 (Fla. 1972) (challenging
candidates via writ of mandamus).
216
See, e.g., Worthy, 63 N.C. at 200 (“It is insisted . . . that the County Commissioners . . .
have no power to enquire as to his qualifications; . . . that their duty is merely ministerial, and
involves the exercise of no discretion, and that the Court will enforce its performance by mandamus, and leave the petitioner’s right to hold the office to be tested by proceedings under
211
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In Indiana, the chosen example state, there may be one more possibility: challenges brought pursuant to the procedure described in the preceding Section that are
not rendered final by sixty days prior to the election may be decided post-election,
resulting in a declaration that the office is vacant.217 Outside of that process, a
challenge would likely need to be brought via a petition for a writ of mandamus
directed at the Indiana Secretary of State, who the Indiana constitution entrusts the
issuance of commissions,218 or by the Secretary of State himself, via a finding that
the officer-elect/appointee is ineligible and consequently refusing to issue the
commission. If the Secretary of State unilaterally refuses to issue the commission,
then mandamus may be sought by the officer-elect/appointee.219
3. Post-Assumption of Office
Once a person receives their commission and becomes a state officer, the
primary way to effectuate Section 3 is through writs of quo warranto, though some
states replace these writs with statutory mechanisms. Like mandamus, quo warranto
is an extraordinary writ that originated in English common law.220 While mandamus
is used to compel public office holders to act, quo warranto is used to remove
people who are found to be usurping their office.221 Unlike mandamus, however, quo
warranto originated as a prerogative writ—meaning that, at least originally, only the
sovereign was able to initiate proceedings.222 Eventually, this changed to allow
private individuals to bring quo warranto proceedings in the name of the sovereign
after requesting leave of court.223 Multiple states have replaced this common-law
writ with statutory or constitutional quo warranto variants.224 It is also possible that
a quo warranto. The solemn act of administering an oath and inducting into office, may not be
merely ministerial. But if it were, the Court will not compel them to do wrong, if it be clear
that they did right.”).
217
IND. CODE § 3-8-8-8.
218
IND. CONST. art. 15, § 6. Unlike at the federal level, Indiana’s Secretary of State is elected,
rather than appointed by the state’s chief executive. See, e.g., Indiana Election Results, IND.
ELECTION DIV., https://enr.indianavoters.in.gov/archive/2018General/index.html [https://
perma.cc/EUV8-8XKQ] (last updated Jan 01, 2019, 9:31 AM). Consequently, there is a larger
chance that a Secretary of State could oppose gubernatorial appointees.
219
See, e.g., infra Section IV.C (discussing the Worthy cases, which stemmed from sua
sponte refusal to swear somebody into office).
220
For background on quo warranto as of 1897, see Quo Warranto, 2 BOUVIER’S LAW
DICTIONARY & CONCISE ENCYCL. (Rawles Rev., 1897).
221
See id.
222
See id.
223
See Quo-Warranto-By Private Persons as Relators to Oust Others From Public Office–De
Facto Officers, 10 IND. L.J. 531, 531 (1935) (discussing the ability of private citizens to bring
quo warranto proceedings) (internal citations omitted).
224
See, e.g., Quo Warranto, CAL. ATT’Y GEN. OFF., https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb
/pdfs/ag_opinions/quo-warranto-guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GZK-6UF5] (last visited
Oct. 27, 2021) (listing the quo warranto California statutes).
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some states could abolish quo warranto proceedings and put in place a wholly new
procedure for removing ineligible people from office.225
The example state, Indiana, has replaced the common-law writ by statute.226
Informations may be filed against any person who “usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office . . . within Indiana” or who “does or allows
an act which, by law, works a forfeiture of the officer’s office.”227 These informations
can be brought either “by the prosecuting attorney in the circuit court, superior court,
or probate court, . . . whenever the prosecuting attorney determines it to be [their] . . .
duty to do so” or “is directed by the court or other competent authority” or “by any
other person . . . [who] claims an interest in the office . . . that is the subject of the
information.”228 The person bringing the information must address the court with a
“plain statement of the facts that constitute the grounds of the proceeding,”229 but when
brought by the county prosecutor, that statement must state whether a vacancy will result from ouster or whether a different person should be granted the office.230 Then,
“a summons shall issue, which shall be served and returned as in other actions. The
defendant shall appear and answer, or suffer default, and subsequent proceedings are
the same as in other cases.”231 If the court then finds that the officeholder is ineligible,
then either the person ruled to have proper title will be given the office, and potentially be awarded damages, or a vacancy will be created as if a valid officeholder
had died.232
***
Through the example of Indiana, this Section has explored potential paths that
somebody looking to invoke Section 3 against a state officer might take. Similar
225

I am not presently aware of any such new mechanisms, but they may presently exist because, at the risk of being a broken record, a full fifty-state survey is beyond the scope of this
Article. Absent an accessible quo warranto approach, indirect attacks on qualifications through
actions for injunctive relief, similar to what happens in the Appointment Clause context, may
be available.
226
See IND. CODE § 34-17-1-1.
227
Id.
228
Id. § 34-17-2-1. While, as discussed below, the federal government uses the “American
Rule” to declare the runner-up of an election as not entitled to, and thus having no interest
in, its outcome, there is nothing requiring states to do the same. See infra Sections III.B.3 and
IV.A.1. Consequently, quo warranto mechanisms in some states that limit complaints to
interested parties may nevertheless be more inclusive than for federal offices.
229
IND. CODE § 34-17-2-5.
230
Id. § 34-17-2-6.
231
Id. § 34-17-2-7.
232
Id. §§ 34-17-3-1 to -2. Damages, in this sense, likely are just the costs of litigation. Id.
§§ 34-17-3-4 to -5 (listing the remedies for a victory by the plaintiff); id. § 34-17-3-7 (listing
the remedies for a victory by the defendant).
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paths, though using different mechanisms, are available in each state233 and should
be further expounded upon to guarantee the states are not allowing disqualified
individuals to serve. The next Section will explore the paths that somebody looking
to invoke Section 3 against a federal officer might take, and then this Part will
conclude by examining how one can challenge a Member of Congress.
B. Federal Office Challenges
Section 3 as it pertains to federal officers is simpler than the state-office variant
because there is uniformity in the rules. Unlike with states, the only federal officers
“elected” by the people are electoral college members and nominees for President
and Vice President of the United States.234 All other offices are filled according to
the Appointments Clause or the Twelfth Amendment.235 What constitutes an office
of the United States is discussed more in Section I.A. As with the previous Section,
this Section will proceed by separating out challenges into three categories: preelection/appointment; post-appointment but pre-assumption of office; and postassumption of office.
1. Pre-Election/Appointment
Unlike the state offices discussed above, the only elected federal officers are
presidential electors and nominees for the President and Vice President of the United
States, though they are not democratically selected by the people of the several
states themselves.236
Though it has not always been the case, the popular vote is now used in the
selection of presidential electors in every state.237 The different states still have a
role, however, in selecting these electors even if they ultimately end up deferring to
their people’s will.238 Because of this, each state hosts a popular election for presidential and vice-presidential candidates and then uses its results to appoint its
233
See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-961 (discussing the procedures for challenging
candidates in Mississippi); Election Official Forms: Challenge Forms, MONT. SEC’Y STATE,
https://sosmt.gov/elections/official-forms/#challenge-forms [https://perma.cc/GL2Q-SNTV]
(last visited Oct. 27, 2021) (listing candidate challenge forms in Montana).
234
As noted above, the electors are not actually federal officers and nominees for federal
office are only representatives of their political party, but for convenience’s sake they have
been included in this Section. In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890) (“Although the electors
are appointed and act under and pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, they are
no more officers or agents of the United States than are . . . the people of the States when
acting as electors of representatives in Congress.”).
235
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; id. amend. XII.
236
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
237
Chiafolo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2319 (2020).
238
Id. at 2321 n.1 (discussing the variation in two states’ methods from the others).

190

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:153

electors.239 These electors are appointed and, for the reasons noted above,240 it may
be impossible to preemptively challenge them.
But states can restrict ballot access for those who are constitutionally disqualified to be President or Vice President for the primaries through their challenging
mechanisms discussed above, or they can refuse to allow their electors to vote for
disqualified candidates.241 Some states have tried to abuse this power by adding
extraconstitutional qualifications, but they are limited to those in the Constitution.242
For non-elector appointed office, Section 3 enforcement may depend on the
procedural mechanism by which the office must be filled. For principal officers and
select inferior officers, the President must nominate somebody, and the Senate must
confirm their appointment.243 For all other officers of the United States, they may be
appointed according to law by principal officers, the courts of law, or the President
directly.244 The former category can have their qualifications challenged before their
appointment is confirmed by the Senate while the latter cannot, but recourse may be
limited to political mechanisms because it is ultimately the Senate’s choice.245
2. Post-Election (Day), Pre-Inauguration
After election day, states retain the “initial and principle authority” over election
contests and are therefore the first place to contest the qualifications of the election’s
239

Id. at 2319.
See discussion supra Sections III.A–B.
241
To reiterate, while states can enforce constitutional disqualifications, states do not have
the power to add qualifications or pass ballot-access laws that bar otherwise-qualified candidates
from seeking federal offices. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 832–34
(1995); Schaefer v. Townsend, 215 F.3d 1031, 1034–38 (9th Cir. 2000). The Term Limits opinion could even be read as mandating that states enforce constitutional disqualifications. 514
U.S. at 833–34 (“[T]he Framers understood the Elections Clause as a grant of authority to issue
procedural regulations, and not as a source of power to . . . evade important constitutional restraints.”). If a state has reason to think that somebody is disqualified but refuses to act, they
could be seen as using their discretion to “evade important constitutional restraints” on who can
become President. There are not, however, many cases where presidential qualifications have
been challenged. For an example of a state addressing a challenge per the procedures outlined
above, see N.H. Ballot Comm’n, Written Decision 2015-2, https://sos.nh.gov/elections/elections
/ballot-law-commission/2015-2016-ballot-law-commission/ [https://perma.cc/N58Q-UPKB]
(last visited Oct. 27, 2021) (deciding that a challenger had not met their burden against
Republican presidential candidate Ted Cruz’s ballot access ahead of the 2016 election).
242
Most recently, California tried to add its own qualifications to the office of the presidency,
but both the State’s Supreme Court and the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of California rejected the law as against the state and federal constitutions. Griffin v. Padilla,
408 F. Supp. 3d 1169, 1187 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2019); Patterson v. Padilla, 451 P.3d 1171, 1191
(Cal. Nov. 21, 2019); see also Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 522 (2001) (explaining that
states’ control over ballot access must be a delegation from the federal Constitution).
243
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
244
Id.
245
See id.
240
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winner.246 But one must remember that “the presidential election is in essence 50
state and District of Columbia elections for presidential electors”247 rather than one
election for the President or Vice President. The state-level contests would more
properly be used to disqualify presidential electors, rather than to disqualify the
President-Elect.248 But the state can always appoint somebody new to vote for the
same person.249 After the electors send their votes to be certified by a joint session
of Congress, any Congressperson can contest any vote.250 If at least one Senator and
one Member sign a written challenge to a vote, the House and Senate will then convene separately to address the challenge.251 But to disqualify a duly certified elector,
both the House and Senate must agree that the certificate was not “regularly given.”252
If enough votes are contested successfully due to disqualification so that there is no
President by the deadline, then the Vice President shall act as President.253 If there
is no Vice President due to disqualification, the President must then use the normal
avenue for appointing a Vice President.254 The political implications of Congresspeople stopping the winner of the presidential or vice-presidential election from
becoming President or Vice President may make this method of Section 3 enforcement
the least likely of all.255
246

How Can the Results of a Presidential Election Be Contested?, CRS REPORTS & ANALY-

SIS, LEGAL SIDEBAR (Aug. 26, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/contest.pdf [https://perma

.cc/V3CM-Z7RZ] ; see also 3 U.S.C. §§ 5–6.
247
LEGAL SIDEBAR, supra note 246.
248
States could pass laws prohibiting their electors from casting votes for people disqualified by Section 3. This, theoretically, could provide a path for Supreme Court resolution after
a state’s supreme court weighs in on the candidate’s rather than the elector’s qualifications.
But no individual state would have the right to challenge another state’s electors’ votes. See
Texas v. Pennsylvania, 141 S. Ct. 1230, 1230 (2020) (mem.).
249
See Chiafolo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2328 (2020).
250
3 U.S.C. § 15.
251
Id.
252
Id. It is not entirely clear whether Congress has the power to object to an elector as notqualified or casting a ballot for a not-qualified President or Vice President, or whether their
objections are limited to the form and transmission of the certificates. The procedures and
limits for objecting were challenged after the 2020 election in the Eastern District of Texas
and the District for the District of Columbia, but those complaints were dismissed for lack
of standing. Gohmert v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435, 443 (E.D. Tex. 2021), aff’d 832 F. App’x
349 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam); Wis. Voters All. v. Pence, 514 F. Supp. 3d. 117, 120 (D.D.C.
2021); see also Stephen A. Siegel, The Conscientious Congressman’s Guide to the Electoral
Count Act of 1887, 56 FLA. L. REV. 541, 614–16 (2004).
253
U.S. CONST. amend. XII. If the Vice President is also disqualified, then the Speaker of
the House would act as President. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1)–(2).
254
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2.
255
Even after the 2020 election, when the desire among congresspeople to overturn state
elections was at its highest since perhaps 1876, the attempts did not come close to succeeding.
See, e.g., The Latest: Trump Promises ‘Orderly Transition’ on Jan. 20, A.P. (Jan. 06, 2021, 10:15
PM), https://apnews.com/article/ap-electoral-college-congress-7af85d3c702e070464d7713c
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3. Post-Assumption of Office
Because nobody will have standing to challenge someone’s qualifications before
they are nominated, and because the confirmation process relies on political remedies, most federal officers cannot be challenged until after they assume office.256 And
until another mechanism is made available by Congress, this must be done through
quo warranto proceedings.257 Quo warranto is an extraordinary writ that has not been
federally invoked enough to have its bounds clearly delineated. In 1915, the Supreme
Court held that, for a District of Columbia office, the District’s quo warranto rules
applied.258 These rules allow quo warranto actions to be brought by the United
States Attorney General or by an interested third party—someone with a claim to the
office—with leave of court.259 But the District of Columbia quo warranto rules were
broad and purported to apply to all public officials within the District, so the Court said:
[I]f a private citizen and taxpayer could institute quo warranto
proceedings to test the title to the [District] office . . ., he could,
under the same claim of right, institute like proceedings against
any of those statutory officers of the United States who, in the
District, exercise many important functions which affect persons
and things throughout the entire country.260
42cf254a [https://perma.cc/JJ7Y-VL5G] (noting that the attempt to challenge Arizona’s electors
failed in the Senate by a vote of 93–6). A serious attempt at this may require repeal or invalidation of the Electoral Count Act of 1887. See, e.g., Gohmert, 510 F. Supp. 3d at 438–39; Wis.
Voters All., 514 F. Supp. 3d. at 118. For an example of how this process could look without the
Electoral Count Act, see generally PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELECTORAL COMM’N OF 1877, http://
memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llec&fileName=001/llec001.db&recNum=4
[https://perma.cc/AVJ4-TPVN] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
256
See discussion supra Section III.A.3.
257
As discussed infra note 365, there is no statute mandating quo warranto proceedings
to disqualify officers. Instead, the federal courts have the ability to hear such disputes through
the All Writs Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which preserves the common law writ when
“appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions.” See also Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475,
1497 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he ‘direct’ attack which the doctrine provides as the exclusive
remedy is a quo warranto action.”). But see In re James, 241 F. Supp. 858, 860 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (“The only federal authority for the institution of quo warranto proceedings is Title
16 of the District of Columbia Code . . . .”). Qualifications may also be challenged indirectly
as part of an action seeking an injunction against official action, but that would not by itself
result in the officer’s removal from office. Andrade, 729 F.2d at 1498. But see In re Griffin,
11 F. Cas. 7, 20 (C.C.D. Va. 1869) (No. 5,815) (rejecting such an indirect attack without an ex
ante determination that the officer was disqualified).
258
Newman v. United States ex rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537, 537–38, 544–46 (1915).
259
Id. at 550 (“The interest which will justify such a proceeding by a private individual must
be more than that of another taxpayer. It must be an ‘interest in the office itself, and must be
peculiar to the applicant.’”); see also D.C. CODE §§ 16-3502 to -3503.
260
Newman, 238 U.S. at 551.
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This language suggests that the Supreme Court considers all federal offices
within the District of Columbia subject to the District’s quo warranto rules. Some
other courts have interpreted it more broadly. The District of Columbia Circuit and
the Southern District of New York have read the Supreme Court’s Newman opinion to
mean that the District of Columbia quo warranto rules apply to all federal officers.261
It appears equally likely that the Supreme Court’s Newman opinion should be read
to mean that all federal offices in the District of Columbia should be subject to the
District’s quo warranto rules but that other offices are subject to different rules.262
While the mechanisms for challenging non-District federal offices are not entirely settled,263 offices within the District have a clearer enforcement mechanism.
People who do not have a peculiar interest in the office must petition the Attorney
General to institute a quo warranto proceeding.264 If the Attorney General refuses,
then the non-interested person cannot bring a challenge.265 If the Attorney General
refuses to institute a quo warranto proceeding for an interested person, then that
person may apply to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for
leave to issue the writ in the name of the United States.266 This application for leave
must be verified and set forth the grounds for such relief.267 The court then has broad
discretion as to whether the writ should issue or not.268
The District of Columbia’s quo warranto rules are “cumbersome and could
easily operate to deprive a plaintiff with an otherwise legitimate claim of the opportunity to have his case heard.”269 This potential deprivation stems from problems with
enforceability where, for example, an Attorney General is not especially motivated
to highlight political allies’ indiscretions. In most of these cases, the rules “effectively bar [] access to court,” so there may be some necessary reliance on showing
disqualification through a request for injunction against an action by said officer.270
Such an injunctive action would have to be brought “at or around the time that the
challenged government action is taken” and would have to show that the relevant
agency “had reasonable notice under all the circumstances of the claimed defect in
261

In re James, 241 F. Supp. at 858 (applying quo warranto rules in proceedings against the
Office of the United States Congressional Representative of the 18th Congressional District of
the State of New York).
262
These “different rules” would likely have to derive from the common-law writ. Though,
in light of Newman, it would make sense to use the rules from whichever state the federal office
is located in, those states’ rules—unlike the District’s—do not constitute federal law. See D.C.
Home Rule Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973).
263
FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a)(4).
264
D.C. CODE §§ 16-3502 to -03; Newman, 238 U.S. at 549–50.
265
Newman, 238 U.S. at 549–50.
266
D.C. CODE § 16-3503.
267
Id. § 16-3502.
268
Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
269
Id.
270
Id.
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the official’s title to office.”271 The prospects of such an action rely in large part on
modern courts distinguishing or abrogating In re Griffin, where Chief Justice Chase,
riding circuit, rejected a similar approach.272 But given the general shift in which
branch is entrusted with the Fourteenth Amendment and the familiarity courts have
with Appointments Clause proceedings, it is not unreasonable to expect modern
courts to do just that.273
C. Congressional Challenges
Unlike with officers of the United States and the several states, the decision
maker for congressional qualification challenges does not change depending on
procedural posture. Challenged Senator-elects will always be judged by the Senate
and Representative-elects will always be judged by the House of Representatives.274
And though there is a different standard for exclusion and expulsion—with exclusion requiring only a majority of the chamber and expulsion requiring two-thirds
concurrence—Congress has repeatedly allowed challenged members-elect to be
sworn in “without prejudice” to a challenge of their qualifications.275 That means
challenges brought prior to becoming a member of Congress ought to uniformly be
resolved by a simple majority vote of the relevant chamber, regardless of how long
the process drags on or whether they end up serving in the role in the interim. It is
unclear whether sitting congresspeople who become disqualified are subject to
exclusion or expulsion.276 Regardless, the legislative immunity provided by the
Speech or Debate Clause does not appear to protect Members from exclusion or
expulsion by their chamber for disqualifying acts.277
271

Id. at 1499.
In re Griffin, 11 F. Cas. 7 (Chase, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1869) (No. 5,815) (rejecting
an indirect attack without an ex ante determination that the officer was disqualified).
273
See infra note 369; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976), superseded in part by
statute, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (noting as
relevant whether an individual wields “significant authority”); see also Freytag v. Comm’r, 501
U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991) (noting as relevant whether the tasks performed are “ministerial”
and whether there is a grant of discretion); Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2054–55 (2018)
(applying Freytag and holding SEC Administrative Law Judges are officers of the United
States since they are effectively given quasi-judicial executive power).
274
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
275
See, e.g., infra Section IV.E.
276
The question boils down to whether the distinction is temporal (exclusion being proper
pre–swearing in and expulsion post–swearing in) or subject-matter specific (exclusion being
proper for qualifications and expulsion for unruly behavior). It appears the latter has more merit,
but arguments can be made both ways. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. See generally Adrian
Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361,
391–97 (2004).
277
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“[F]or any Speech or Debate in either house, [congresspeople]
272
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The House of Representatives, unlike the Senate, allows for elections to be
contested by any other candidate claiming a right to the office.278 These contestants
must, within thirty days, file with the Clerk of the House and serve upon the Representative-elect notice of the contest stating with particularity the grounds for the
contest.279 The Representative-elect then has thirty days to answer.280 Following
months of briefing, motions practice, and evidence gathering, the contest is determined on the papers by the House Oversight Committee.281 But going into granular
detail about this avenue for contest is unnecessary because Section 3 challenges will
likely never survive a pre-answer motion to dismiss.282 Contestants must be able to
claim a right to the office, but disqualification of a Representative-elect does not
nullify the votes cast for them and, under the American rule, no other candidate
would have the requisite majority.283 But the filing of a contest may be enough to put
the House on notice and prompt them to investigate whether exclusion is proper.
While neither the House nor the Senate can create new qualifications,284 they
both can shape their exclusion (or expulsion) proceedings. Typically, either a
Member-elect challenges another Member-elect’s qualifications at the time of swearing
in or a sitting Member petitions a Member-elect’s qualifications prior to swearing
in.285 Either way, proper credentialing by the state officials in charge of administering the election creates a presumption of qualification and the challenger must
establish a prima facie case for disqualification “before putting [the challenged] to
the expense and the burden of making a defense.”286 Once such a prima facie case
is made, the matters are typically referred to either a temporary specialized committee or a standing committee for hearings and recommendations, which are then
presented to the chamber as a whole for a vote.287 If a majority then votes to exclude,
the election is declared vacant and the relevant constitutional procedure for filling
the vacancy must be followed.288
shall not be questioned in any other Place”) (emphasis added); see also Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 501–06 (1969) (highlighting the Speech or Debate Clause’s function as protecting
the legislative branch from intrusion by the judiciary or executive).
278
2 U.S.C. § 382(a).
279
Id. §§ 382(a)–(b).
280
Id. §§ 382(b), 383. Failure to answer does not, however, amount to an admission or entitle
the contestant to the seat. Id. § 385.
281
Id. §§ 381, 392.
282
Id. § 383(b); see also JACK MASKELL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS
OF CONGRESS 9–10 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41946.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V6F
-S3MC] (“It does not appear that a ‘contested election’ procedure or complaint . . . is the
proper vehicle to challenge the ‘qualifications’ or eligibility of a Member-elect.”).
283
2 U.S.C. § 383(b)(4); infra Section IV.A.1.
284
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
285
MASKELL, supra note 282, at 5–6.
286
Id. at 6–7 (quoting 1 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS, supra note 103, § 427).
287
See generally infra Part IV.
288
See infra Section IV.A.1.
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IV. NOTABLE APPLICATIONS OF SECTION 3
This Part will examine each notable invocation of Section 3, by federal courts,
state courts, and each chamber of Congress, in chronological order.289 Section 3 is
jurisdictionally unique in that challenges against people claiming right to different
offices are subjected to different, independent decision makers.290 Nothing requires
that these different adjudicatory bodies maintain a uniform standard or test—for
example, the Senate could disregard the Supreme Court’s test, were it to ever develop
one, and vice versa291—but this Part treats each invocation as general precedent for
Section 3 in hope that further developments would maintain some uniformity and
thereby minimize doctrinal confusion.
A. The Kentucky & Tennessee Cases
In the two years separating congressional approval of the Fourteenth Amendment and its ratification, four elections were contested in the House of Representatives because of issues relevant to Section 3.292 Three of those came from Kentucky
and one from Tennessee.293 The Senate also saw an election contest during this
period, concerning another man from Tennessee.294 Given the timing, the contestants
could not actually invoke Section 3.295 But because the Amendment had passed Congress only a year before the contests, and because those who brought them were
among the Members who voted Yea,296 these petitions were littered with relevant
concepts, and we can judge the Fortieth Congress’s reception to those similar arguments
as indicative of their expectations as to Section 3’s application.297 That being said, there
are important differences: the enforceability of these types of claims pre-ratification
was tenuous at best and relied on an Act of Congress that was concerned only with
289

There are a handful of other congressional invocations, but they largely represent only
the most open-and-shut cases that provide no insight for the nuances of Section 3. See 1 HINDS’
PRECEDENTS, supra note 103, at 441–63.
290
See supra Part III.
291
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (“Particularly in view of the Congress’
own doubts in those few cases where it did exclude members-elect, we are not inclined to give
its precedents controlling weight. The relevancy of prior exclusion cases is limited largely to the
insight they afford in correctly ascertaining the draftsmen’s intent. Obviously, therefore, the
precedential value of these cases tends to increase in proportion to their proximity to the [constitutional drafting].”).
292
1 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS, supra note 103, at 440–59.
293
Id.
294
Id. at 459–61.
295
PROCLAMATION OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD, SEC’Y OF STATE (July 28, 1868), https://
memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=015/llsl015.db&recNum=741
[https://perma.cc/5QCV-VC9R].
296
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3041–42 (1866).
297
H.R. DOC. NO. 40-13, at 1–2 (1867).
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the oath of office;298 and the relevant language was limited to protect American democracy from domestic enemies, the confederates, rather than the broader language
of Section 3.299
1. The Exclusion of John Y. Brown
The case of Smith v. Brown300 was the first, and perhaps most extreme, of these
pre–Section 3 loyalty challenges. That contest saw a Representative-elect be excluded for writing a letter to a newspaper for publication. John Brown was accused
in the Louisville Courier of saying, “I would not send one solitary man to aid that
Government, and those who volunteer should be shot down in their tracks.”301 Brown,
apparently outraged at the ambiguity of that statement, sent a letter to the editors
offering a correction:
This ambiguous report of my remarks has, I find, been misunderstood by some who have read it, who construe my language
to apply to the government of the Confederate States! What I did
say was this:
Not one man or one dollar will Kentucky furnish Lincoln to aid
him in his unholy war against the South. If this northern army
shall attempt to cross our borders, we will resist it unto the
death; and if one man shall be found in our Commonwealth to
volunteer to join them he ought and I believe will be shot down
before he leaves the State.
This was not said in reply to any question propounded . . . and
is no more than I frequently uttered publicly and privately prior
to my debate with him.302
This evidence alone was the basis for Brown’s exclusion from the Fortieth Congress.303
298

Act to Prescribe an Oath of Office, ch. 128, 12 Stat. 502–03 (1862) (repealed 1868) (requiring officers of the United States to swear or affirm, under penalty of perjury, that they had
never, among other things, given aid or encouragement to those engaged in armed hostility
against the United States); H.R. REP. NO. 40-59 (1868) (“John D. Young . . . is not entitled
to take the oath of office as a representative in this house . . . or to hold a seat therein . . . .”).
299
Act to Prescribe an Oath of Office, ch. 128, 12 Stat. 502–03 (1862) (repealed 1868).
300
House Comm. on Elections, Samuel E. Smith vs. John Young Brown, 40th Cong., 2d
sess., H.R. Rep. No. 11 (1868).
301
1 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS, supra note 103, at 445.
302
Id. (emphasis omitted).
303
Id. at 445–48.
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As alluded to above, this exclusion was entirely unconstitutional.304 Not only
was this an example of an extraconstitutional qualification—a fact that was not lost
upon a number of Congressmen305—but it was based on an Act of Congress plainly
violative of the First Amendment. Had Section 3 been ratified by this point, these
concerns would be assuaged.
The remainder of the Committee on Elections’ efforts were focused on whether
the challenger, Samuel Smith, was entitled to what would have been Brown’s seat,
having the second-most votes in his favor.306 The so-called American Rule was then
re-established; Smith was not entitled to the seat because he did not receive a majority of the votes and “any attempt to substitute therefor the will of a minority is an
attack upon the fundamental principles of the Government.”307
2. The Exclusion of John D. Young
Next, Congressman Samuel McKee contested the election of his would-be replacement, John D. Young.308 The Committee on Elections concluded that Young was not
entitled to take the oath of office as a Representative nor hold a seat in the House.309
Representative McKee levied the following charges against Young in his challenge:
[D]uring the late rebellion you did not remain loyal to the government of the United States; [] you voluntarily gave aid, countenance, counsel, and encouragement to persons engaged in armed
hostility thereto; [] you were in full sympathy, free accord, and
entire harmony with those persons who were engaged in armed
rebellion against the government of the United States . . . ; [] in
1861 you avowed yourself in favor of raising and arming troops in
Kentucky to resist the federal government . . . ; [] you did aid,
countenance, advise, counsel, and encourage the raising or recruiting men for the purpose of resisting the authority and laws of the
United States, and . . . such persons [] did array themselves in
304

88 CONG. REC. 2484 (1942); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (holding the
House of Representative may not exclude a duly elected representative for any reason unless
it is mentioned in the Qualifications of Members Clause).
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1 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS, supra note 103, at 446.
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Id. at 448–51.
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H.R. DOC. NO. 40-13, at 1 (1867).
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H.R. REP. NO. 40-59, at 1, 3 (1868). Congress provided a general grant of amnesty by
the requisite two-thirds majority following the Committee’s disposition holding him ineligible.
General Amnesty Act of 1872, ch. 193, 17 Stat. 142 (1872). Following this lift of his ineligibility,
he was later elected to Congress in a different Kentucky congressional district. YOUNG, John
Duncan, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/People/Detail/21084
[https://perma.cc/7ZPL-VRKA] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
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armed hostility to the government of the United States, and
contributed to the support of the same . . . ; [] you voluntarily
gave information by means of which Union soldiers were captured by armed bands of rebels . . . . [W]hen summoned by the
United States authorities in 1862 to take the oath of allegiance
to the government of the United States, you refused to take said
oath, and fled into Canada. . . . [Y]ou were loud in your denunciations of the government of the United States, and declared
yourself openly for secession and the southern confederacy. []
[D]uring the late canvass for Congress in which you were a
candidate, you declared that you left the country in 1862 because
you could not and would not take the oath to support the Constitution and laws of the United States, for the reason that you were
in favor of secession and desired the rebellion to succeed. [B]y
reason of all these, and many other disloyal acts, you are disqualified by the Constitution and laws of the United States from
holding any office of trust or profit thereunder.310
These charges run the gamut of what potentially could be enforced as aiding and
comforting an enemy under Section 3, from simply declaring one’s self in support
of secession to actively exposing Union soldiers to Confederate forces so that they
may be captured as prisoners of war.311 As noted, these charges were framed as violations of the Ironclad Oath rather than Section 3.312 The Committee, in resolving the
dispute, utilized language both lending itself to the Ironclad Oath and the thenpending Section 3. For example, in House Report 40-29, the Committee went out of its
way to state “aid and comfort may be given to an enemy by words of encouragement,
or the expression of an opinion, from one occupying an influential position”313—
despite the phrase not appearing in the Oath—before resolving that “John D. Young,
having voluntarily given aid, countenance, counsel, and encouragement . . . is not
entitled to take the oath of office . . . or to hold a seat.”314
310

H.R. DOC. NO. 40-13, at 1–2 (1867).
Id.
312
Compare Act to Prescribe an Oath of Office, ch. 128, 12 Stat. 502–03 (1862) (repealed
1868) (requiring hopeful officers to swear they “have never voluntarily borne arms against the
United States . . . ; [] have voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement
to persons engaged in armed hostility thereto; [] have neither sought nor accepted . . . any authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States; [] have not yielded a voluntary
support to any pretended government . . . within the United States, hostile or inimical thereto.”),
with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3 (“No person shall be a . . . Representative in Congress . . .
who . . . engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the [United States], or given aid or
comfort to the enemies thereof.”).
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H.R. REP. NO. 40-29, at 2 (1868) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Voluntarily feeding and arming enemy soldiers and directing enemy soldiers as
to the location of where they can capture American soldiers plainly constitutes aiding
or comforting the enemy, so this discussion instead focuses on the Committee’s
other findings, relating to: words of encouragement, expressions of opinion, and disclaimers of loyalty.315 On the merits, the Committee discussed Young’s views that:
the Civil War was a justified revolution, not a rebellion;316 that President Lincoln
“ought to be impeached and hung as high as Haman” but that Jefferson Davis should
go unpunished;317 and that the south should be independent.318 The Committee also
noted that nothing “show[ed] or indicate[d] that he ever was or ever claimed to be
a Union man during the whole struggle for the life of the nation” nor that “he was
even so lukewarm in his devotion to the government as to have been neutral and
indifferent.”319 The Committee then concluded “such expressions and admissions . . .
of sympathy . . . with the rebellious party, taken in connection with the open acts of
‘aid and comfort to the enemies of the government of the United States,’” show that
Young “cannot honestly and truly take the oath prescribed.”320
The House appears to have been conflicted as to whether the speech acts noted
above constituted aid or comfort to the Confederacy, stating that aid and comfort
may be given by words of encouragement and expressions of opinion but not
explicitly classifying his specific words or opinions as such.321 Given how clearly
the other acts are classifiable as aid and comfort, one interpretation is that the House
decided they did not need to address the hard question. Another interpretation is that
sympathetic statements showing passive disdain for the United States or its actions
do not quite rise to the level of John Brown’s call to action.
3. The Admission of Lawrence S. Trimble
The third of the Kentucky cases, Symes v. Trimble,322 was the only one that
resulted in admission. Lawrence Trimble was alleged to have engaged in “contraband trade with the enemies of the Government”—a charge which was found “too
vague and uncertain to be relied on”—and with opposing the Lincoln Administration’s “abolition war” effort while running for Congress in 1861.323 Unlike above,
however, Trimble was running as the Union candidate for Congress in opposition
to Kentucky’s secession efforts.324 The Committee noted that “it is evident from the
315
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whole testimony that his opposition was expressed in language similar to that . . . on the
floor of Congress” and declared “his loyalty unquestioned.”325 The best reading of
Trimble’s case may be that because he was actively supporting the Union in opposition to a secessionist candidate when making these statements, he was actually
aiding and comforting the United States rather than its enemies, albeit by politically
unsavory means.
B. The Exclusion of Philip F. Thomas
Philip Thomas was elected to become one of Maryland’s United States Senators,
but rumors concerning his loyalty began to circulate.326 Acting on these rumors, the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary took up a challenge to his qualifications.327 After
the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee—Senator Lyman Trumbull—convincingly
argued that “[i]t will not do to assume the position that every person who disagrees
with us politically is an enemy of this country,”328 it was discovered that Thomas
“allowed his minor son to leave the paternal house to serve as a rebel soldier, and
gave him at the time $100 in money.”329 It was also noted that the $100 was “in case
he was captured and needed money in prison” and that Thomas thereafter “refused
to communicate with him.”330 Following a lengthy discussion on whether the
Fourteenth Amendment had been duly ratified—it had not—and on the ability of the
Senate to add extraconstitutional qualifications, the Senate concluded that Thomas
was not entitled to take the oath of office under the Ironclad Oath.331 The Thomas
challenge can be read to stand for the proposition that aiding or comforting any
enemy of the United States—even one’s own child—may trigger Section 3; aiding
the enemy state is not required.
C. Worthy v. Barrett and Worthy v. Commissioners332
In 1868, the commissioners of Moore County, North Carolina independently
refused to qualify a man as Sheriff who had served in the position both before and
during the Civil War because of the Fourteenth Amendment and an accompanying
state statute.333 Sheriff Worthy petitioned the North Carolina courts for a writ of
325
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mandamus, insisting that county commissioners “have no power to enquire as to his
qualifications” and insisted that the Court should “leave the petitioner’s right to hold
the office to be tested by proceedings under a quo warranto.”334 But, after a superior
court judge granted the writ, the commissioners appealed and the state’s supreme
court dismissed the petition.335
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that: (1) holding any office under the
confederate government; or (2) “[v]oluntarily aiding the rebellion, by personal
service, or by contributions, other than charitable, of any thing that was useful or
necessary in the Confederate service” disqualifies a person under Section 3.336 It was
uncontroverted that Sheriff Worthy served as Sheriff under the confederate government, so the court’s discussion focused exclusively on the definition of an officer.337
Justice Reade distinguished “officers” from “placemen,” noting multiple factors
such as whether there is payment for established duties, but ultimately settling on
the simple formalist test discussed above and classifying a sheriff as an officer.338
Sheriff Worthy, not accepting the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s determination, petitioned for a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States.339
His petition stated:
The 1st section of the 14th amendment of the Constitution of the
United States, declares that, ‘No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States.’
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has decided that a sheriff
is an executive officer, and that the right to hold office by a
person formerly a sheriff, and afterwards engaged in rebellion,
is taken away by the 3d section of the 14th amendment. This is
an assault upon an immunity and privilege granted to us by the
1st section of that same amendment. We have a right to know
how far the guaranty of the 1st section extends . . . . Cases involving rights that are protected by the Constitution, come
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, no matter
whence the rights may spring.340
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The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.341 And in
dismissing the petition, Chief Justice Chase noted that Worthy’s “right” to the office
was a state right, and that:
[t]here was no decision by the Supreme Court of North Carolina
against the validity of any treaty or act of Congress, or authority
exercised under the United States; nor in favor of the validity of a
statute of, or authority exercised under a State, and alleged to be repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States.342
In other words, because the federal constitutional provision restricted a state
right, and because Worthy did not challenge the state action as repugnant to Section 3,
the Supreme Court refused jurisdiction over the petition. Further, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause issue raised in the petition was not “set up, or specially claimed
in the State court,” so the Court could not use that as a basis for its jurisdiction.343
While the Worthy v. Commissioners Court seemed to open the door for the argument that a state’s improper prohibition of somebody from taking office may implicate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Slaughter-House Cases convincingly
slammed that door shut.344 More importantly, the Supreme Court’s opinion stands as
an example of the jurisdictional complexities that one must worry about—without a
well-pleaded state-court complaint, the federal courts may not be able to review Section
3 disqualifications.345 Without identifying a federal right to the office claimed, those
prohibited or removed from office by state actors may be barred from federal court.346
D. In re Griffin347
Following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, there was a surge in
recently freed slaves challenging criminal convictions because of their judges’
confederate proclivities through habeas corpus.348 One such case involved Caesar
Griffin, who was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for assault with intent to kill
341
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by Judge Sheffey, a former officer of the rebelling state of Virginia.349 Chief Justice
Chase, serving as circuit justice for the Virginia Circuit,350 stated “the question to be
considered . . . is whether upon a sound construction of the amendment, it must be
regarded as operating directly, without any intermediate proceeding whatever, upon
all persons within the category of prohibition, and as depriving them at once, and
absolutely, of all official authority and power.”351
Griffin’s attorney argued that Section 3 acts proprio vigore, “without the aid of
additional legislation to carry it into effect.”352 He asserted Sheffey was usurping the
office “in open defiance of the highest law of the land” and that, as a consequence, “he
was not in law a judge . . . and his acts as a pretended judge have no legal validity
whatsoever.”353 The attorney recognized that “public discussion of this question will
doubtless tend to call public attention” as to whether he can continue to serve as a
judge, but reassured the court they were neither seeking nor expecting Sheffey’s
removal from office.354
Sheffey’s attorney conceded ineligibility arguendo355 and went on to argue that:
[U]ntil he is selected and condemned by name by due process of
law, no judgment can have effect as against him. He must be
personally condemned by an act of sovereignty like a . . . judgment of a court after trial and conviction. While, therefore, it
may be true that a party condemned by a judge, ousted by name
from office by a constitutional amendment, would be deprived
of his liberty contrary to the constitution of the United States, it
is clear that, until a judge is thus ousted by name . . . his holding
office is still colore officii, and his acts those of a judge de facto.
The constitutional amendment is a general act of attainder—a
statute denouncing a general penalty for crime. The penalty applies
to every person who is guilty; but his guilt can only be ascertained,
the identity of the individual can only be made certain, the penalty
349
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were not established until 1891. See The U.S. Circuit Courts and the Federal Judiciary, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-circuit-courts-and-federal-judiciary
[https://perma.cc/EC75-XBEP] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
351
Griffin, 11 F. Cas. at 23.
352
Id. at 12.
353
Id.
354
Id.
355
Id. at 18 (“I shall first admit, for the purpose of this argument in this place, that Sheffey
was, by the adoption of the constitutional amendment . . . rendered ineligible for his office,
and from that moment became, in law, incapable of holding it. This being admitted . . . he was
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applied to that particular individual, only by due process of
law—i.e., trial, conviction and judgment. . . . The constitutional
amendment only differs from a penal statute in this, that being
ex post facto, it could only have become law by becoming part
of the constitution. . . . No officer, therefore, holding office, who
is in fact ineligible under the constitutional amendment, can be
affected by it until its provisions are applied to him according to
law, nor can his holding be contrary to the constitution until
such application is legally made.356
Chief Justice Chase concluded that Section 3 did not act proprio vigore and that
Sheffey—regardless of his constitutional eligibility for office—had not yet been
removed from office.357
The Chief Justice noted that a literal construction of the text acting alone could
have the effect to “on the day of its promulgation, vacate[] all offices held by
persons within the category of prohibition,” and if that construction were used, it
would make “all official acts, performed by them, since that day, null and void.”358
Dissatisfied by that result, the Chief Justice followed up by recognizing the “great
attention” paid to the inconveniences that result from strictly literal constructions.359
While noting that concerns about inconvenience cannot “prevail over plain words
or clear reason,” he said that “a construction, which must necessarily occasion great
public and private mischief, must never be preferred to a construction which will
occasion neither, or neither in so great degree, unless the terms of the instrument
absolutely require” it.360 Then, he considered the immediate consequences of a
proprio vigore Section 3: nullification of all official acts of all officers who did not
voluntarily give up their office, including criminal sentences, deed transferences,
etc.361 These consequences would, in the Chief Justice’s opinion, be disastrous.362
Again recognizing that inconveniences themselves are not sufficient to disregard
the sole reasonable meaning, the Chief Justice stated:
Of two constructions, either of which is warranted by the
words . . . , that is to be preferred which best harmonizes the
amendment with the general terms and spirit of the act amended.
This principle forbids a construction of the amendment, not clearly
356
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required by its terms, which will bring it into conflict or disaccord
with the other provisions of the constitution.363
The proprio vigore reading would deprive a whole class of people of their held
offices, “at once without trial,” in a manner “inconsistent in the[] spirit and general
purpose” of the numerous constitutional provisions that disallow deprivation of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law or that disallow bills of attainder and
ex post facto laws.364 The Chief Justice saw a second reasonable construction, contrary to Griffin’s proprio vigore reading: Section 3 needs Section 5 legislation to
become operative.365 Section 5 states that: “Congress shall have the power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”366 According to Chief Justice
Chase, this reading, also “warranted by the words” of Section 3, is in better harmony
with the rest of the Constitution than the proprio vigore one.367
Absent congressional action, strict compliance with In re Griffin would render
Section 3 null.368 But in the intervening years, the Fourteenth Amendment has been
reconceptualized as primarily being judicially, rather than congressionally, enforceable.369 It would be inherently inconsistent to interpret “No state shall . . . .” as selfexecuting but “No person shall . . . .” as requiring enacting legislation.370 Regardless,
363
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In re Griffin shows that due-process protections of the Fifth Amendment were not
implicitly amended by Section 3 proprio vigore, and that no person is disqualified
without the relevant decision maker proclaiming as such.
E. The Admission of Lewis McKenzie
The House of Representatives, by the time the Forty-First Congress began, had
changed their modus operandi for Section 3 adjudication. When Lewis McKenzie’s
loyalty was questioned, the House allowed him to be sworn in as a Member of
Congress “without prejudice” to the exclusion proceeding.371 This leads to interesting questions of whether removal of a sworn in congressperson, which typically
requires expulsion,372 due to disqualification can be carried out by a simple majority
through exclusion.373 While that question was never answered, the Committee of
Elections did answer the question of McKenzie’s qualifications.
McKenzie was a member of the pre-secession Virginia House of Delegates. In
that role, he voted for a resolution stating that, should negotiations break down
between the northern and southern states, “every consideration of honor and interest
demand that Virginia [] unite her destiny with the slaveholding States of the
South.”374 He also voted for appropriating state funds for arms and munition, stating
in support: “Virginia is not afraid. When the convention comes to a decision . . . and
it is ratified by the people, she will take her position, and, if necessary, fight.”375
Then, he voted to appropriate funds to “the Emmet Guards and to the Irish volunteers . . . which soon after entered the Confederate service.”376 Finally, the military
authorities of Virginia seized some of his possessions.377 Just over two weeks later,
the State of Virginia seceded.378
The Committee on Elections found that “the only government to which Mr.
McKenzie yielded support . . . was that State of Virginia” and that “[i]t could not be
pretended that he yielded support to any government hostile to the United States.”379
like what Griffin had been seeking, is proper, but that Sheffey’s attorney’s argument—requiring
due process before the penalty attached—should carry the day. See supra notes 351–52 and
accompanying text.
371
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The Committee further found that “[a] good deal of evidence in [McKenzie’s] case
was taken to show that . . . [he] was known and accepted generally by all, both the
loyal and disloyal people . . . , as a friend of the Union cause.”380 Responding to the
contestant’s objection that his friendliness to the Union was irrelevant, the Committee conceded that, “[i]f the acts make him ineligible, neither prior, subsequent, nor
contemporaneous loyalty could make him eligible or do more than furnish a ground
for him to ask to be relieved from his disabilities,” but found that such evidence of loyalty “though not receivable as a defense, is properly to be received, as enabling us
the better to understand the acts themselves and to determine their true character.”381
Without much further discussion, the Committee reported that “nothing shown
in the evidence in this case makes [McKenzie] ineligible” under Section 3.382 The
apparent takeaway is the truism that aid and comfort given to an entity that is not yet
an enemy of the United States cannot be used to disqualify somebody from holding
office, even if that entity shortly thereafter becomes an enemy. The other thing that
may be gleamed from McKenzie’s case is that when statements are made or acts are
committed that could be considered aid or comfort to an enemy of the United States
but do not constitute a prima facie case, all relevant circumstantial and contextual
evidence may be considered so that the decision maker may “better understand the
acts themselves” and “determine their true character.”383
F. United States v. Powell384
The Enforcement Act contained two relevant provisions. The first, from section
14, directed United States Attorneys385 to seek removal of those disqualified by
Section 3.386 The second, from section 15, criminalized accepting office while disqualified by Section 3.387 Powell concerned the second and took the form of a circuit
judge charging the jury.388 Amos Powell was being charged with accepting the office
of sheriff while disqualified by Section 3.389
Powell argued that Section 3 “was passed to punish those high in authority in
the rebellious states at the time of the outbreak of the Rebellion, for their bad faith
toward the government they had sworn to support, and was not intended to reach
380
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those who had minor offices,”390 but the court held otherwise.391 The court directed
the jury to read “[t]he words of the statute [as] broad enough to embrace every
officer in the state,” whether “legislative, judicial, or executive[.]”392
As for the substantive charges against Powell, it was said that he furnished a
substitute for himself to the Confederate army and held a commission of justice of the
peace under the Confederate government.393 As to the former charge, Powell claimed
that he did not furnish a substitute voluntarily but was conscripted and overcome by
force so that he could not resist.394 The court directed the jury that to “engage” in
insurrection “implies, and was intended to imply, a voluntary effort to assist the Insurrection or Rebell[i]on . . . and unless you find the defendant did that, with which
he is charged, voluntarily, and not by compulsion, he is not guilty of the indictment.”395
The court clarified that “not every appearance of force nor timid fear [] will excuse
[] actual participation in the Rebellion or Insurrection.”396 Instead, a defendant’s
conduct “must have been prompted by a well grounded fear of great bodily harm
and the result of force, which the defendant was neither able to escape nor resist.”397
As to the latter charge, the court was “of [the] opinion that he might well have
held that office without giving adherence or countenance to the Rebellion.”398
Whether it rose to the level requisite for the indictment was left to the jury, and there
is no record of their decision, but the court was open to the idea that serving as a
peace officer was an action outside the bounds of engaging in insurrection or rebellion
because “[i]t was absolutely necessary that during that commotion there should have
been some to preserve order and to restrain the vicious and licentious, who . . . would
have taken advantage of the turmoil to pillage and destroy friend and foe alike.”399
It may be tempting to view Powell as standing primarily for the proposition that
all Section 3 enforcement would be contingent on the voluntariness of the accused’s
disloyal actions; it is important to remember though that that conclusion is only expressly valid as to engaging in insurrection or rebellion, not giving aid or comfort.400
This being said, the similarities between engaging in insurrection or rebellion and
giving aid or comfort should allow for reading the voluntariness requirement into
aid or comfort as well as engaging in insurrection or rebellion. Both “engaging” and
390
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“giving” are present participles that imply an action was taken. If this conclusion is
carried over, the discussion about what constitutes voluntariness would be helpful
precedent. The other proposition that it stands for is that holding a peacekeeping
office necessary to a functioning society may not be enough to show participation
in an insurrection and cause the disqualification to attach; circumstances are important and must be considered.401
G. The Exclusion of Victor L. Berger
In 1911, Victor Berger, the first Socialist Congressperson,402 started the Milwaukee
Leader, a Socialist periodical.403 He lost his seat in the 1912 election.404 Then, in April
1917, the United States declared war on Germany and formally entered the First World
War.405 This led top Socialists, including Berger, to draft and release a manifesto opposing American involvement in the war.406 The Milwaukee Leader, still led by Berger,
reprinted the manifesto and characterized it as a “cool, scientific Marxian declaration.”407 President Roosevelt characterized it as treason.408 In addition to the manifesto’s publication, the Socialists created a political platform of, among other things,
“[r]esistance to compulsory military training and to the conscription of life and
labor” and “[r]epudiation of war debts.”409 The Milwaukee Leader published and
praised the party’s platform,410 and printed an editorial from Berger himself aimed at
pressuring Milwaukee’s Socialist mayor—who supposedly was worried subscribing to
the party’s stance on war would violate his oath of office—into toeing the party line.411
All of this, in addition to countless other war-related publications, led the Postmaster General to revoke the Milwaukee Leader’s mailing privileges under the Espionage Act because of a purpose and intent to:
401

See also Hudspeth v. Garrigues, 21 La. Ann. 684, 685 (1869); The Reconstruction Acts,
12 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 141, 162 (1867) (“The interests of humanity require such officers for the
performance of such official conduct in time of war or insurrection as well as in time of
peace, and the performance of such duties can never be considered as criminal. I cannot bring
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.loc.gov/rr/news/topics/berger.html [https://perma.cc/U6EW-7WUZ] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021)
(providing a timeline of Berger’s public life).
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[W]illfully make or convey false reports or false statements with
intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or
naval forces of the United States, to promote the success of its
enemies during [World War I], and willfully cause and attempt
to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, and refusal of duty
in the military or naval forces of the United States, and to willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service in the United
States, to the injury of the service and of the United States.412
Four months later, Berger was indicted for violating the Espionage Act.413 While
awaiting trial, however, Berger was elected to the Sixty-Sixth Congress.414 Ultimately, he was convicted and sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment.415 Berger
appealed, and while that was pending, he was set to be sworn into the Sixty-Sixth
Congress.416 But the Speaker of the House refused to administer the oath after
another Member challenged his qualifications.417 Following a year of congressional
hearings, the House committee—tasked with determining whether Berger violated
the Espionage Act, whether he gave aid or comfort to enemies of the United States
during the First World War, and whether he was ineligible to a seat in the House—
determined that he gave aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States and that
he was disqualified by Section 3.418
Berger had argued that Section 3 was included to punish those who fought with
the Confederacy and that it was entirely repealed when Congress provided blanket
amnesty.419 The Special Committee was not convinced:
It must be perfectly evident that Congress has no power whatever to repeal a provision of the Constitution by a mere statute,
and that no portion of the Constitution can be repealed except in
the manner prescribed by the Constitution itself. While under the
provisions of [Section 3] Congress was given the power, by a
two-thirds vote of each House, to remove disabilities incurred
under [Section 3], manifestly it could only remove disabilities
incurred previously to the passage of the act, and Congress in the
412
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very nature of things would not have the power to remove any
future disabilities. This was plainly recognized when the words
“heretofore incurred” were placed in the [amnesty] act itself.420
Berger also argued that Section 3, as an “outgrowth of the Civil War,” could not be
read to apply to the First World War.421 Again, the Special Committee was not convinced. The Special Committee responded to that assertion by saying:
It is perfectly true that the entire fourteenth amendment was the
child of the Civil War and that its main purpose was the security
and protection of the political and civil rights of the African
race. It is equally true, however, that its provisions are for all
time, and are as the United States Supreme Court well said in the
case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, “universal in their application to all
persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, color, or of nationality.” It is inconceivable
that the House of Representatives, which without such an express provision in the Constitution repeatedly asserted its right
to exclude Members-elect for disloyalty, should ignore this plain
prohibition which has been contained in the fundamental law of
the Nation for more than half a century.422
Having established that Section 3 was current and applicable, the Special
Committee turned to determine what it meant to “give aid or comfort” and what the
First Amendment means by “freedom of speech.”423 The Special Committee turned
to McKee v. Young, discussed above, in determining that “aid and comfort may be
given to an enemy, by words of encouragement, or the expression of an opinion
from one occupying an influential position” and then to the case of Smith v. Brown,
also discussed above, to establish that past Congresses have successfully excluded
for disloyalty based only on a letter written to a newspaper.424 As to freedom of
speech, the Special Committee quoted Justice Brandeis’ opinion in Sugarman v.
United States425 in saying that “‘freedom of speech’ does not mean that a man may
say whatever he pleases without the possibility of being called to account for it” and
referred to Justice Holmes’ opinion in Schenk v. United States,426 which held that the
420
421
422
423
424
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content of publications, very similar to those at issue for Berger, could be used for
Espionage Act violations.427
After considering all of the evidence, the House of Representatives voted, 311–1,
to disqualify Berger.428 The Special Committee was convinced that Berger violated
the Espionage Act and “thus gave aid and comfort to its enemies.”429 One Member
of the Special Committee had argued that the House should not decide that matter
until Berger, whose appeal was still pending, had exhausted judicial recourse, but
the House disagreed.430 When a special election was called to fill what would have
been Berger’s seat, he was re-elected and the House again refused to seat him.431
Eventually, the Supreme Court overturned Berger’s Espionage Act conviction,
though not on the merits.432 Having his name “cleared” by the Supreme Court, Berger
again ran for, and was elected to, the House of Representatives in 1922, where he
served until losing the 1928 election.433
For some reason, the House of Representatives allowed him to take the oath of
office and be sworn in as a Member, notwithstanding the existing Section 3 disqualification, without an amnesty resolution.434 It is likely that the Sixty-Eighth Congress
figured that, since the Supreme Court nullified the guilty verdict, he did not give aid
or comfort to the Germans. As logical as that may sound, it is still contrary to
Section 3. The House of Representatives determined, outside of the courts, that the
actions being considered by the courts plainly showed that Berger did “willfully
hinder, obstruct, and embarrass the Government of the United States and thus gave
aid and comfort to its enemies, and . . . [wa]s unfit and ineligible to sit as a member”
and thought allowing him into Congress “inconceivable.”435 The Sixty-Sixth Congress was correct in saying that “it [was] not only the right but the constitutional
duty of the House to exclude him”436 after finding that he gave aid and comfort to
enemies of the United States and the Sixty-Eighth, Sixty-Ninth, and Seventieth
Congresses failed to carry out their constitutional duties by allowing him to sit.
427
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The case of Victor Berger helps inform analysis of Section 3 in three primary
ways beyond its affirmation that it applies outside the context of the Civil War: first,
by showing that, as suggested in McKee v. Young and Smith v. Brown,437 simple
words opposing the American war efforts with the intent to shift the tide of public
opinion away from supporting them can be sufficient to render one disqualified
under Section 3; second, as also evidenced by other Red Scare examples,438 that
social paranoia may expose people to Section 3 punishment simply for holding radical
political views where similar comments made by mainstream politicians would be
forgiven;439 and third, that Congress, left to its own devices, may have trouble properly
enforcing disqualifications as political circumstances change.
V. APPLYING THE TEST
This Section will use a hypothetical test–case of X, a former cabinet department
secretary working as a registered lobbyist for a state-owned Iranian company. X was
arrested in one of the 2020 George Floyd protests and wishes to enter Indiana’s
gubernatorial race. Because this is a state office and the dispute is before the election, the decision maker would be the Indiana Election Division and the challenge
can be brought by any eligible Indiana voter.440 Additionally, as a former cabinetlevel secretary, X was an officer of the United States for Section 3’s precondition
and a state’s governorship is an office that Section 3 can disqualify somebody
from.441 Having established that X is within the reach of Section 3, the remainder of
this Part will work through a determination of X’s eligibility.
A. Did X Engage in Insurrection or Rebellion?
To be disqualified by Section 3 for engaging in insurrection or rebellion, somebody must voluntarily take part in a scheme that causes domestic unrest in opposition to state or federal laws after the President issues a Proclamation pursuant to the
437
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Insurrection Act ordering the uprising to disperse.442 X did not do so, and consequently cannot be disqualified on this basis. Following the murder of George Floyd
in Minneapolis, protests sprung up across the country with the stated goal of enacting comprehensive police reform.443 Some of these protests devolved into riots.444
Whether a riot clears the insurrection hurdle is basically determined by the ability of the
state’s justice system to suppress it.445 If the state cannot handle the uprising, then the
state’s legislature can request federal intervention.446 No state legislature requested
federal military intervention. Alternatively, the President can make a determination
that an uprising deprives a state’s people of their federal rights and label it an
insurrection on this basis.447 Whether the riots deprived people of their federal rights
is a far tougher question, but it is one that does not need to be answered because
President Trump never issued a proclamation ordering the agitators to disperse.448
He never even tweeted something to that end.449 Consequently, it does not appear
that X can be said to have engaged in insurrection nor does it appear that he can be
disqualified on that basis.
B. Did X Give Aid or Comfort to an Enemy of the United States?
Whether X gave aid or comfort to an enemy of the United States is really two
questions: (1) can their act be considered aid or comfort; and (2) is the beneficiary an
442
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enemy of the United States?450 X’s work lobbying will be considered aid or comfort
and Iran may be considered an enemy of the United States, so X might be ineligible
on this basis.
1. Does Lobbying Qualify as Aid or Comfort?
Regardless of approach, lobbying should fall squarely within the definition of
“aid or comfort.”451 Historically, lobbying is providing a service for one’s client and,
as shown by Carlisle v. United States,452 providing goods or services was considered
giving aid or comfort—regardless of if the provider actually believed in the cause
they were furthering as long as they knew who it was they were providing the good
to or the service for.453 Lobbyists “cannot be permitted to stand on the nice metaphysical distinction that, although he knows that the purchaser buys the goods for
the purpose of aiding the [client’s cause], he does not sell them for that purpose. . . .
[They] must be taken to intend the consequences of [their] own voluntary act.”454
2. Is Iran an Enemy of the United States?
Enemies of the United States must “at least conform[] to the traditional requirement[s]” of an enemy, and such assertions must be “supported by other actions of the
political departments.”455 Further, “[t]he declaration of enemy status cannot come in
the indictment itself.”456 Whether Iran is an enemy of the United States is a question
without a clear answer.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “enemy” as “adversary.”457 Merriam-Webster defines it as “one that is antagonistic to another”; “something harmful or deadly”; or
“a military adversary.”458 A nationwide poll of American adults, conducted in 2019,
shows that over three quarters of Americans view one of Russia, China, North
Korea, and Iran as the single “greatest enemy” of the United States.459 According to that
poll, just under 10% of Americans in 2019—prior to the designation of the Iranian
450
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Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist organization and prior to the strikes that killed
Soleimani460—considered Iran the single greatest threat to America.461 That number,
less than a decade ago, was over 30%.462 In 2013, 45% of Americans considered Iran
an enemy, and another 38% viewed it as an “unfriendly” country.463 A more recent
poll shows that Iran is the least liked country among Americans.464 While the average
American may consider Iran an enemy, a Section 3—or treason—determination must
go deeper.
There is very little useful doctrine because federal treason charges have only
been litigated in connection to major wars, such as World War II, where there was
never a question as to who the enemy was.465 The historical understanding of an
enemy of the United States is a (1) subject of a foreign power that is in a state of
open hostilities with the United States or (2) subjects of a domestic group exercising
de facto sovereignty and levying war against the United States.466 Iran is a foreign
power, so the sole question is whether we are in a state of open hostilities. Ignoring
“closed” hostilities, like Stuxnet,467 there are a number of things that may indicate
a state of open hostilities. The White House has claimed legal authority to use military
action against Iranian forces.468 The United States has stopped trade with and imposed economic sanctions on Iran.469 Iranians chant “Death to America” in the
460
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streets and compare the United States to a “poisonous scorpion whose nature it is to
sting and cannot be stopped unless it is crushed.”470 American drones have attacked
Iranian officials and Iran has struck back at American troops.471 Though there is not
a declared war, that is not needed to label a nation as an enemy.472 To use the words
of Justice Washington from Bas v. Tingy: America and Iran “certainly [are] not
friends, because there was a contention by force; nor were they private enemies,
because the contention was external, and authorised by the legitimate authority of
two governments.”473
The President, who is tasked with controlling the military and maintaining diplomatic relations, recognizes a state of open hostility with Iran through repeated
military strikes, imposition of sanctions, and elimination of diplomatic relations.474
But the President has not expressly labelled Iran an enemy.475 Further complicating
the matter is that Congress has made clear that they oppose the President’s treatment
of Iran.476 Structural questions of this sort are typically answered within the Youngstown framework.477 This framework explains that there are three classifications of
executive action: those that are in accordance with the views of Congress, where the
President can exercise the joint powers of the branches; those where Congress has
failed to weigh in on the issue, known as the “zone of twilight”; and those where Congress has opposed the President’s action, where the President’s power is “at its lowest
ebb” and is limited strictly to Article II.478 In issues of foreign relations such as these,
the President reigns supreme.479 So, regardless of which Youngstown classification this
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ends up in, the President has the power to make the determination. With the proper
branch of the federal government weighing in, the decision maker—here a state election
division—would only be taking action in line with the President’s course of action.
But “declaring a nation or a group to be an ‘enemy’ is tantamount to a declaration of war” and “raises thorny questions of foreign relations.”480 Even after considering all of the hostile acts between the United States and Iran, it should be noted
and weight should be given to the fact that there has been no formal label attached
by the federal government. The President has labelled the Iranian Revolutionary Guards
a terrorist group and has declared that he has the authority to strike Iranian forces,
but he has not declared war and has sought to avoid escalation.481 Iran’s Supreme
Leader has justified the chanting of “Death to America” by saying it means “Death to
Trump,” but they have avoided direct conflict by other than proxy forces.482 Because
of this, and because of Congress’s skepticism regarding military conflict with Iran,
a prudent decision maker may think it best to err on the side of not “declaring war.”
***
Whether Iran is an enemy of the United States is a close call, and the Indiana
Election Division could come out either way. If they decide that Iran is an enemy,
then X would be disqualified from becoming Governor upon the decision becoming
final. It is also possible that after the initial determination, the federal government
could intervene and state its position more clearly before the appeal is heard. If the
election division decides against Iran being an enemy, then X will be free to run for
the governorship.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that the Fourteenth Amendment is more than its first
section, and that Section 3 can be used to protect the integrity of the offices of the
United States and the several States. It has broken down the text of Section 3 to
identify what the law actually is and has analyzed precedent.483 It has further devised
(indicating the shift in power from Congress to the President as the focus shifts from domestic
to foreign affairs).
480
See Larson, supra note 99, at 920–21.
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Jeff Mason, Ahmed Aboulenein & Parisa Hafezi, U.S., Iran Both Appear to Signal
Desire to Avoid Further Conflict, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2020, 2:39 AM), https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-iraq-security/u-s-iran-both-appear-to-signal-desire-to-avoid-further-conflict
-idUSKBN1Z60NL [https://perma.cc/S3TF-F22Q].
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Thomas Erdbrink, ‘Death to America’ Means ‘Death to Trump,’ Iran’s Supreme Leader
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483
See supra Parts I–III.

220

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:153

an overarching test for future Section 3 challenges and applied that test to a hypothetical official; that application showed that seemingly innocuous things can call
into question the qualifications of public officials.484
Section 3 is powerful and facially vague, making it an especially attractive cudgel
for political warfare.485 Thankfully, history and practice have clearly delineated certain
limiting principles that should be maintained to limit its abuse.486 To summarize: if
somebody has taken an oath to uphold the Constitution for a position “exercising
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States”487 and then either (1)
voluntarily takes part in a scheme causing enough domestic unrest to prompt an
Insurrection Act proclamation488 or (2) acts in a way that strengthens entities that the
United States is in a state of open hostilities with, then they may be disqualified
from holding any office under the United States, unless two-thirds of each chamber
of Congress grants them amnesty.489
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See supra Part V.
The Quo Warranto Cases, NASHVILLE UNION & AM. (Nov. 6, 1870), https://chronicl
ingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85033699/1870-11-06/ed-1/seq-2/#date1=08%2F 10%2F1868&index
=3&date2=12%2F31%2F1872&dateFilterType=range&page=1 [https://perma.cc/3NTN-NN
UN] (“The Court . . . held that the section being highly penal, must be strictly construed . . . .”).
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